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Ending Litigation and Financial 
Windfalls on Time-Barred Debts 
Marc C. McAllister* 
Abstract 
A trap for unsophisticated debtors, debt collectors often attempt 
to collect time-barred debts through written offers to settle those 
debts for a fraction of what is owed. Debtors typically respond to 
such offers in one of four ways. First, some debtors simply pay the 
offered settlement amount, usually 10%–40% of the total 
outstanding debt, thereby satisfying the debt in full. Second, those 
who wish to eliminate the debt but cannot pay the entire offered 
settlement amount will instead make a small payment, unwittingly 
reviving the statute of limitations on collections and making the 
entire debt judicially enforceable for several years to follow. Third, 
some debtors simply disregard the matter, which often leads to a 
suit to collect the debt, where results range from the debtor owing 
nothing (if he defends and asserts the statute of limitations defense) 
to a judgment far exceeding the amount of the debt (if the debtor 
does not defend and the matter is resolved by default judgment). 
Finally, some debtors sue the collector for unlawful collection 
efforts, where results vary based on the precise wording of the 
collector’s offer letter and whether such an offer is deemed unlawful 
in the debtor’s jurisdiction.  
When a debtor exercises either of the first two options, the result 
is a windfall to collectors, who might otherwise be unable to collect 
on the debt due to the statute of limitations. When a debtor exercises 
either of the final two options, already-overburdened courts are 
swamped with difficult and unnecessary cases.  
                                                                                                     
 * Marc McAllister is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Texas State 
University. Professor McAllister has ten years of law school teaching experience 
and has completed three federal judicial clerkships. His articles have been 
published in the Florida State Law Review, Hofstra Law Review, Seattle Law 
Review, Cincinnati Law Review, Penn State Law Review, and Case Western 
Reserve Law Review, among others. 
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This Article proposes a series of reforms designed to ease the 
burden on courts while generating financial outcomes that are 
roughly the same for all time-barred debts. For written attempts to 
collect time-barred debts, this Article proposes warnings informing 
the debtor that the statute of limitations has run on the debt and 
that any payment will reset the limitations period for its entire 
amount, as well as an opportunity for the debtor to pay the proposed 
settlement amount, and no more, in installments.  
As an additional layer of protection, this Article proposes an 
amendment to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 
plainly declaring that suing to collect on a time-barred debt violates 
the FDCPA, along with another amendment clarifying that it is 
lawful for a collector to seek repayment on a time-barred debt 
outside of court, but only if the notices and promises proposed above 
are included in the collector’s written settlement offer.  
As a final layer of protection, this Article proposes changes to 
existing rules that deem the statute of limitations defense waived 
unless asserted. Under this proposal, a plaintiff attempting to 
collect an old debt would be required to prove, with evidence, that a 
debt is not time-barred in order to obtain a judgment, default or 
otherwise, in the case. As a backstop to this proposal, this Article 
further proposes that courts screen all motions for default 
judgments in consumer debt suits and dismiss those cases where 
the plaintiff fails to prove the suit is timely.  
In combination, these proposals will resolve the present circuit 
split on the lawfulness of collection efforts on time-barred debts, 
make financial outcomes more uniform across similarly-situated 
debtors, and ensure that most collection activity on time-barred 
debts occurs outside the judicial process, alleviating courts of this 
burdensome litigation.  
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I. Introduction 
Americans have a lot of debt,1 and often experience difficulties 
paying their debts.2 These circumstances have given rise to the 
13.7 billion dollar debt collection industry, which includes 
approximately 6,000 collection agencies,3 affects nearly 77 million 
Americans,4 and is one of the fastest growing industries today.5  
Much debt collector revenue derives from medical debt, 
student loans, credit cards, student loans, and mortgages.6 When 
consumers are unable to pay their debts, debt owners typically 
deem the consumer in default, and eventually “charge off” the debt 
and place it in collection.7 Collection efforts may then be made by 
                                                                                                     
 1. As of November 2016, the Federal Reserve reported that Americans have 
$3.75 trillion in consumer debt. See Federal Reserve, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. 
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm#fn1a (last 
updated Oct. 6, 2017) (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (detailing outstanding consumer 
credit from 2012 to present) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
This data covers most credit extended to individuals, excluding loans secured by 
real estate. Id. Of this amount, $2.76 trillion consists of non-revolving debt, such 
as student and vehicle loans, whereas $992.4 billion consists of revolving debt, 
which includes credit card debt. Id. In addition, as of September 30, 2012, about 
$1.01 trillion of consumer debt was delinquent and $740 billion was seriously 
delinquent (at least 90 days late). See Conor P. Duffy, A Sum Uncertain: 
Preserving Due Process and Preventing Default Judgments in Consumer Debt 
Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147, 1152 n.15 (2013) 
(reporting Federal Reserve data). 
 2. See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some 
Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355, 
355 (2012) (describing one debtor’s experience regarding a credit card debt she 
was unable to pay after having become ill and unable to work). 
 3. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: 
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practices-
act.pdf. 
 4. See id. (noting a recent study finding that 35% of Americans, more than 
77 million people, had a trade line on their credit reports indicating some type of 
debt in collections). 
 5. See Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 
N.M. L. REV. 327, 333–38 (2014) (examining the rapid growth in the debt 
collection industry); Fox, supra note 2, at 357 (noting that “[t]he debt industry is 
one of the few booming industries left in America”). 
 6. 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
 7. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented 
Consumer, 73 MO. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (2008) (noting that 6% of all personal credit 
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the original creditor or present owner of the debt (called first-party 
debt collectors), or by third-party debt collectors consisting of both 
debt collection firms and law firms that specialize in such 
collection efforts.8  
More than half of third-party collector revenue, $7.5 billion, is 
generated by collectors contracting with creditors to collect their 
debts on a contingency fee basis under which any amount collected 
is split between the creditor and collector.9 Under such 
arrangements, collectors’ fees may increase based on the age of the 
accounts.10 In general, older accounts offer larger fees, creating 
incentives to use more aggressive collection tactics.11 Because 
third-party debt collectors seek to collect as much money as they 
can on old debts for themselves and their creditor clients, their 
interests are adverse to consumers.12 In addition, as compared to 
creditors, who compete for consumer business, third-party debt 
collectors may be relatively unconcerned with their reputation 
amongst consumers.13 For these reasons, third-party debt 
collectors have little market incentive to attempt to collect debts in 
                                                                                                     
card accounts are charged off annually); Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt 
Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 52 (2015) (explaining that “[a] charge-off has no 
effect on the validity or enforceability of the debt; it is simply an accounting 
procedure”). 
 8. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67489 (proposed Nov. 
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
 9. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 (“About one third of 
debt collection revenue, $4.4 billion, comes from debt buyers, who purchase 
accounts from the original creditor or other debt buyers and then generally seek 
to collect on that debt, either themselves or through third-party debt collector.”). 
 10. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1159 (citing FRED WILLIAMS, FIGHT BACK 
AGAINST UNFAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AND PROTECT 
YOURSELF FROM THREATS, LIES AND INTIMIDATION 74 (2011)) (stating that the 
longer fees go uncollected, the greater chance your fees will increase). 
 11. See id. at 1159 (discussing the consequences of growing fees). 
 12. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR 
DEBT COLLECTOR AND DEBT BUYING RULEMAKING: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER 
CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED, 1 (2016) [hereinafter CFPB 
OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS], http://files.consumer 
finance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf (showing that 
debt collection remains a major source of consumer complaints, lawsuits, and 
enforcement actions). 
 13. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849. 
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a non-aggressive manner, generating a need to regulate their 
practices.14  
In 1977, in light of the “abundant evidence of the use of 
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many 
debt collectors,”15 Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act (FDCPA) to govern the collection efforts of 
third-party debt collectors.16 When the FDCPA was enacted, one of 
Congress’s stated purposes was to “eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors.”17 Despite this ambitious 
goal, significant debt collection problems have persisted.18 One 
such problem is the attempted collection of debts that cannot be 
judicially enforced due to expiration of the statute of limitations on 
the debt (“time-barred debts”),19 an issue that has created a recent 
circuit split20 and is the focus of this Article.  
A trap for unsophisticated consumers, debt collectors often 
attempt to collect time-barred debts by offering debtors the 
opportunity to “settle” such debts for a fraction of the amount 
owed.21 In such offers, debt collectors usually fail to convey that the 
                                                                                                     
 14. See id. (“Firms . . . have a limited incentive to engage in less aggressive 
tactics if those tactics lead to increased recovery of debts.”).  
 15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
 16. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995) (explaining that the 
FDCPA prohibits “debt collector[s]” from engaging in various collection practices); 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6) (Westlaw) (defining the term “debt collector” to mean “any 
person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); id. § 1692a(5) (limiting 
“debt” to consumer debt, i.e., debts “arising out of . . . transaction[s]” that “are 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
 18. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851 (“Consumers 
have submitted more complaints to the FTC about debt collectors than any other 
single industry.”). 
 19. A time-barred debt is one that is older than the applicable statute of 
limitations. Id. at 67875. Such debt is also known as “stale” debt, or “out of 
statute” debt. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF THE DEBT 
BUYING INDUSTRY 42 n.174 (2013) [hereinafter FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-
and-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf. 
 20. See infra Part V.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred 
debt may violate the FDCPA). 
 21. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (examining a debt collector’s offer to settle a time-barred debt for 
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debt is no longer enforceable in court; that it likely violates the 
FDCPA for the collector to sue to collect the debt if the debtor does 
not respond to the collector’s offer;22 and that a debtor who makes 
a partial payment on the debt, however small, will revive the 
statute of limitations on the debt and permit judicial recovery of 
the entire balance for many years to follow.23  
When a debtor receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt, 
the debtor will usually exercise one of four options. First, some 
debtors will simply pay the stated settlement amount in full, 
thereby eliminating the debt. Second, debtors who are unable to 
pay the full settlement amount, but wish to pay off the debt, will 
instead pay a portion of the offered settlement, unwittingly 
reviving the statute of limitations on the debt and obligating 
themselves to pay the entire amount owed, which can now be 
judicially enforced.24 A third group of debtors simply disregard all 
collection efforts, even those made in litigation, setting up a 
potential default judgment that will obligate the debtor to pay a 
sum far in excess of the entire debt.25 Finally, some debtors will 
take an aggressive approach by filing suit against the collector for 
unlawful collection practices, often under the FDCPA.26 When such 
debtor suits fail, debtors generally must pay litigation costs and 
                                                                                                     
approximately 35% of the past due account balance on the debt). 
 22. See infra Part V.C (discussing the relevant case law and potential circuit 
split). 
 23. See infra Part III.A (discussing the partial payment rule). 
 24. See, e.g., Yeiter v. Knights of St. Casimir Aid Soc’y, 607 N.W.2d 68, 71 
(Mich. 2000) (explaining that, at least since 1885, “a partial payment [on a debt] 
restarts the running of the limitation period unless it is accompanied by a 
declaration or circumstance that rebuts the implication that the debtor by partial 
payment admits the full obligation”). 
 25. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1165–66 (explaining that judgment amounts 
on consumer debts often exceed the original amount of the debt due to interest, 
fees, and legal costs; and noting that in New York, a judgment holder is entitled 
to 9% annual statutory interest of the judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW 
§ 5004 (McKinney 2017)); Haneman, supra note 7, at 717 (reporting that, due to 
added interest, litigation costs, and attorney’s fees, such cases can result in a 
judgment amount of more than 300% of the amount originally owed). 
 26. See, e.g., Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 395–96 (describing a case where debtor 
sued a collector under the FDCPA after debtor received a collection letter that 
offered to settle her time-barred debt but did not notify her that Michigan’s 
six-year statute of limitations had run or that partial payment would restart the 
applicable statute of limitations). 
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their own attorney fees.27 When such suits prevail, debtors recover 
money themselves, sometimes hundreds of thousands of dollars.28 
Due to a current circuit split involving such debtor suits, the 
success of a debtor’s FDCPA claim will largely depend on the 
jurisdiction where litigation ensues.29  
Depending on a debtor’s knowledge of the complex and 
interwoven laws governing time-barred debts, their willingness to 
engage with a debt collector or participate in litigation over an old 
debt,30 and other variables, such as whether the debtor believes the 
debt is even valid,31 all four of the above options may seem 
perfectly reasonable.32 Yet, some of these options, when exercised, 
result in a financial windfall to the collector, who might otherwise 
be prevented from collecting any portion of the debt due to the 
statute of limitations. Others result in a windfall to the debtor, who 
almost always incurred, yet failed to pay, a debt.33 Current laws 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1179 (2013) (concluding 
that a district court may award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases 
without finding that the plaintiff brought the case in bad faith and to harass). 
 28. See infra notes 142–161 and accompanying text (discussing law firms 
suing debtors for time-barred debts).  
 29. See infra Part VI.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred 
debt may violate the FDCPA); cf. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 115-61) (obligating debt collectors to file collection suits against consumers 
either in the judicial district “in which such consumer signed the contract sued 
upon” or “in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action”). 
 30. See Bernice Yeung, Some Lawyers Want to Keep Debt Collection Out of 
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/ 
us/23sfdebt.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (reporting that debtors often don’t 
respond to collection efforts “because they don’t know how, and that’s how the 
debt buyers make their money”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 31. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 18–19 (reporting that 
the most common debt collection complaint received by the CFPB involves 
continued attempts to collect a debt the consumer reports is not owed). Most of 
those particular complaints report that the debt is not their debt (63%), while 
others report that the debt was already paid (26%), resulted from identity theft 
(6%), or was discharged in bankruptcy (4%). Id. 
 32. See generally Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 400 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “a conscientious debtor” 
who receives an offer to accept about 35 cents on the dollar of what she owed 
would either accept this offer, simply ignore it, or even sue the collector for 
making it). 
 33. There are some circumstances where the debt at issue is not valid, as in 
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and judicial practices permit this range of results. With windfalls 
around every corner, this patchwork of legal standards needs 
repair.  
Examining the debtor’s options in the order presented above, 
Part II of this Article examines the lawfulness of non-judicial 
collection efforts on time-barred debts and examines the initial 
scenario where a debtor elects to pay a collector’s settlement offer 
in full.34 Part III examines the second scenario where a debtor 
makes a partial payment on the debt, including its impact on the 
statute of limitations.35 Part IV reviews the third scenario where a 
debtor fails to respond to collection efforts, including default 
judgments being awarded against such debtors by over-burdened 
courts.36 Part V examines the final scenario where a debtor sues 
for unfair collection practices on time-barred debts, and 
summarizes the current circuit split regarding suits against 
collectors under the FDCPA.37 Finally, Part VI sets forth a series 
of reforms for time-barred debts that will generate more uniform 
outcomes on all such debts with minimal impact on courts.38 Part 
VII concludes.39  
II. Option 1: Paying the Full Offered Settlement Amount 
The debt collection industry includes first-party collectors, 
third-party collectors, and debt buyers.40 Debt buyers purchase 
defaulted debt from original creditors or other debt owners, and 
thereby take title to the debt.41 The older the debt, the less a debt 
buyer will pay for it. According to an FTC Report from 2013: 
                                                                                                     
the case of mistaken identity.  
 34. Infra Part II. 
 35. Infra Part III. 
 36. Infra Part IV. 
 37. Infra Part V. 
 38. Infra Part VI. 
 39. Infra Part VII. 
 40. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67489 (proposed Nov. 
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
 41. FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 1, 47. To 
conduct its study, the FTC obtained information about debts and debt buying 
practices from nine of the largest debt buyers that collectively bought 76.1% of 
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Debt buyers paid on average 3.1 cents per dollar of debt for 
debts that were 3 to 6 years old and 2.2 cents per dollar of debt 
for debts that were 6 to 15 years old compared to 7.9 cents per 
dollar for debts less than 3 years old. Finally, debt buyers paid 
effectively nothing for accounts that were older than fifteen 
years.42 
Once purchased, debt buyers will often either attempt to 
collect the purchased debts themselves or employ third-party 
collectors to collect the debts.43 Once collection efforts begin on 
time-barred debts, which are typically more than three to six years 
old,44 collectors will typically offer to settle those debts for 10%–
40% of the total amount owed.45  
Although courts are split regarding the precise tactics a 
collector may employ to collect a time-barred debt,46 most courts 
agree that a statute of limitations bar does not actually extinguish 
the debt itself.47 According to most courts, the debtor still owes the 
                                                                                                     
the debt sold in 2008. Id. at i. As part of this study, these debt buyers submitted 
data on more than 5,000 portfolios containing nearly 90 million consumer 
accounts with a face value of $143 billion and which were acquired by debt buyers 
for $6.5 billion. Id. at ii. Most portfolios for which debt buyers submitted data 
were credit card debts, which accounted for 71% of the total amount that the 
buyers spent to acquire debts. Id. at ii. The FTC also considered its prior 
enforcement and policy work related to debt collection, as well as available 
research concerning debt buying. Id. The study focused on large debt buyers 
because they account for most of the debt purchased; it did not address the 
practices of smaller debt buyers. Id. at i.  
 42. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2014); 
see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 43 
(2015) (explaining that the low cost at which debt buyers purchase debt reflects 
the risk the buyer is taking that the debt will ultimately be uncollectible). 
 43. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67850. 
 44. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 1941, at 11–29 
(discussing the debt buying market and the process in which one can participate 
in it). 
 45. In McMahon, for example, which consolidated two cases for appeal, one 
collector offered to settle the debtor’s account for 40% of the total outstanding 
balance. 744 F.3d at 1013. In the other case, the collector offered to settle the 
debtor’s account for 30% of the amount due. Id. at 1014; see also Buchanan v. 
Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2015) (examining an offer to 
settle a time-barred debt for approximately 35% of the past due account balance 
on the debt). 
 46. See infra Part VI.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred 
debt may violate the FDCPA). 
 47. See Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 396–97 (noting that, under most states’ laws, 
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debt; however, he has a complete legal defense against having to 
pay it, which, when asserted, would simply prevent a debt owner 
or collector from enforcing the debt in court.48  
Because the debtor still owes a time-barred debt, most courts 
agree that the statute of limitations does not prevent a debt owner 
or collector from seeking to collect even the entire amount of the 
debt outside of court, and that it is appropriate to do so.49 As the 
                                                                                                     
“a debt remains a debt even after the statute of limitations has run on enforcing 
it in court”). 
 48. See, e.g., Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(stating, under New Jersey law, that a debtor’s debt obligation “is not 
extinguished by the expiration of the statute of limitations, even though the debt 
is ultimately unenforceable in a court of law”); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau 
Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[A] statute of limitations does not 
eliminate the debt; it merely limits the judicial remedies available.”); Buchanan, 
776 F.3d at 396–97 (“Under Michigan law, as under the law of most states, a debt 
remains a debt even after the statute of limitations has run on enforcing it in 
court.”); De Vries v. Alger, 44 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Mich. 1950) (“The running of the 
statute of limitations does not cancel the debt, it merely prevents a creditor from 
enforcing his claim.”); Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 616 
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (recognizing that “Illinois law [provides that] the statute of 
limitations bars a specific remedy; it does not extinguish the indebtedness”); 
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 634 n.19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated 
on other grounds by Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141 (Tenn. 2001), as 
recognized by Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 
436, 461 n.25 (Tenn. 2012) (“A statute of limitations bars the remedy only; it does 
not undermine the substance of the plaintiff’s claim or cause of action.”); Shorty 
v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that 
“New Mexico courts have held that statutes of limitations are procedural in 
nature and merely bar judicial remedies by which a party seeks to enforce his or 
her substantive rights”); Webster v. Kowal, 476 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Mass. 1985) 
(recognizing that “[d]ebts barred by the statute of limitations . . . are not void but 
are merely unenforceable”). 
 49. See, e.g., Huertas, 641 F.3d at 32–33 (noting that “it is appropriate for a 
debt collector to request voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt”); 
Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771 (finding an attempt to collect on a time-barred debt 
permissible under the FDCPA because “a statute of limitations does not eliminate 
the debt”); McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020 (clarifying that it is not “automatically 
improper for a debt collector to seek re-payment of time-barred debts,” as long as 
it conforms with the FDCPA, and noting that “some people might consider full 
debt re-payment a moral obligation, even though the legal remedy for the debt 
has been extinguished”); Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 270, 
273 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Since the running of the statute of limitations does not 
extinguish a debt, courts have permitted debt collectors to send collection letters 
for time-barred debt where the letters do not threaten collection action.” (quoting 
Wallace v. Capital One Bank, No. CIV. JFM–00–2290, 2001 WL 357301, at *2 (D. 
Md. Apr. 6, 2001))); Johnson v. Capital One Bank, No. CIV. A. SA00CA315EP, 
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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Buchanan v. 
Northland Group, Inc.50: 
Legal defenses [such as a statute of limitations defense] are not 
moral defenses . . . [a]nd a creditor remains free, in the absence 
of a bankruptcy order or something comparable preventing it 
from trying to collect the debt, to let the debtor know what the 
debt is and to ask her to pay it. There thus is nothing wrong 
with informing debtors that a debt remains unpaid or for that 
matter allowing them to satisfy the debt at a discount.51 
According to Sixth Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge, who 
dissented in Buchanan, a debtor who receives an offer to settle a 
time-barred debt has no legitimate basis to complain of unfair 
collection practices, for the simple reason that the debtor continues 
to have “a legal obligation to pay her debt, even though the 
obligation is no longer enforceable in court.”52 In Judge Kethledge’s 
view, the debtor “did, after all, receive goods or services that she 
did not pay for,” such that the collector “undisputedly would have 
been within its rights simply to demand that she pay all the money 
she owes.”53 As such, attempting to collect an old debt outside of 
court is not inherently unlawful.  
In the typical case, a collector will attempt to collect a 
time-barred debt through written communications, which will 
often include a formal offer to settle the debt.54 When a debtor 
                                                                                                     
2000 WL 1279661, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2000) (“[A] statute of limitations bar 
applies only to judicial remedies; it does not eliminate the debt. Creditors are 
entitled to attempt to pursue even time-barred debts, so long as they comply with 
the rules of the FDCPA.”); Johns v. Northland Grp., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 590, 595 
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (recognizing that a collector is “still permitted to seek voluntary 
repayment of [a time-barred] debt”). 
 50. 776 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 51. Id. at 397; see also id. at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
plaintiff, appellate courts judges, district court, and amici agencies, all agree that 
the debt collector in the case would have been within its lawful rights to send the 
debtor a letter that simply recited the amount of her debt and demanded payment 
in full).  
 52. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 401 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Written communications, but not settlement offers, are required by the 
FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (stating 
that a debt collector must follow up within five days of the initial communication). 
In the letter, the collection must include basic information about the debt, 
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receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt, her first option is to 
simply fully pay the offered settlement amount, which is typically 
10%–40% of the total outstanding debt.55 Debtors—particularly 
unsophisticated ones who are unaware of the complex laws 
governing this issue—may elect this option, even though the debt 
at issue is not legally enforceable, simply to avoid harassment, 
litigation, or adverse credit consequences.56 
Letters containing such settlement offers typically notify the 
debtor that paying the offered settlement amount will satisfy the 
debt and close the account. In Buchanan, for example, debtor 
Esther Buchanan received a collections letter from third-party 
collector Northland Group, Inc., on a time-barred debt owned by 
debt buyer, LVNV.57 Northland’s letter to Buchanan indicated a 
“past due account balance” of $4,768.43, and offered to settle her 
debt for $1,668.96.58 The letter stated that LVNV “is willing to 
reduce your balance by offering you a settlement,” adding that 
upon receipt of $1,668.96, “your account will be satisfied and closed 
and a settlement letter will be issued.”59  
                                                                                                     
including, among other things, the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor, 
and various notices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(1)–(5) (detailing the required contents 
of the debt collector’s communication). In July 2016, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued an “Outline of Proposal Under Consideration 
and Alternatives Considered,” which sets forth proposed rules relating to debt 
collection and debt buying. Among other things, the CFPB Outline proposes that 
collectors should be obligated to provide additional information, beyond what is 
currently required by the FDCPA, to assist consumers in identifying the debt at 
issue. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F; see also Eric P. 
Rosenkoetter & Keith Wier, The CFPB’s Outline of Debt Collection Proposals: A 
Look into the Past and Future, BUS. L. TODAY, 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/10/03_ wier.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2017) (summarizing the proposals) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 55. See supra text accompanying note 45 (providing examples of a debtor 
settling for 30% and 40% of the total outstanding debt). 
 56. See Stepney v. Outsourcing Sols., Inc., No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997) (“Unsophisticated consumers may pay amounts not 
legally owed to avoid harassment or adverse credit consequences.”); see also Sobol, 
supra note 5, at 350–51 (“Similarly, consumers may agree to pay unenforceable 
debts in order to clean their credit reports.”). 
 57. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 395. 
 58. See id. (stating that unless the debtor disputed the debt within 30 days 
of receipt of the letter, the third-party creditor assumed the debt was valid).  
 59. Id. In this scenario where a debtor’s obligation to repay a debt is settled 
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Upon review of the Buchanan letter, both the trial and 
appellate courts agreed that there was “nothing wrong” with 
simply informing Buchanan that her debt remains unpaid and 
“allowing [her] to satisfy the debt at a discount”60—in other words, 
by asking for and receiving payment of the offered settlement 
amount in satisfaction of the debt.61 Far more problematic is the 
scenario where the debtor pays only a portion of the offered 
settlement amount and, in the process, unwittingly revives the 
statute of limitations as to the entire debt, one the collection 
industry refers to as “duping” the debtor.62 
III. Option 2: Partial Payments that Revive the Statute of 
Limitations 
As original creditors sell their debts to other creditors or debt 
buyers, who often then resell debts to similar entities, the debts 
inevitably get older.63 Many states have statutes of limitations 
barring suits to collect on a debt after a certain period, typically 
between three and six years from the last payment received on a 
                                                                                                     
for less than the amount owed, the debtor may have to include the amount of debt 
discharged as taxable income. See generally Bross v. C.I.R., No. 11959-10S, 2012 
WL 6698659 (T.C. Dec. 26, 2012) (involving a taxpayer’s agreement with a credit 
card company where, in return for a partial payment, the credit card company 
canceled the unpaid balance of the credit card account). 
 60. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015); see 
also id. at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (stating Buchanan was offered a 
discount of thirty-five cents on the dollar to repay outstanding debt).  
 61. See generally United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (“A debtor, 
in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement 
with his creditors.”). 
 62. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 349, n.155 (“Given the impact of the 
acknowledgement on a time-barred debt, a collector may attempt to get the 
consumer to recognize the existence of a debt without disclosing that the 
limitation period has run.”); see also Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 401 (Kethledge, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing the “equitable point” raised by the majority that if debtor 
sends creditor less than the settlement amount, then under many states’ laws, 
the limitations period renews and the debt becomes legally enforceable again, and 
conceding that “[v]irtually no one, save the creditors themselves, would welcome 
that result”). 
 63. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 42 (noting 
that as debts are sold they inevitably get older). 
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credit card,64 which represents a large portion of consumer debt.65 
However, savvy debt collectors can avoid the statute of limitations 
through little known and counterintuitive rules regarding debt 
acknowledgment.66  
Statutes of limitations originated in 1623 in England.67 As 
courts have long recognized, statutes of limitations are not mere 
“technicalities,” but instead are “fundamental to a well-ordered 
judicial system.”68 Such statutes serve various purposes. They 
reflect the “legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the 
adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and 
that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail 
over the right to prosecute them.’”69 They are also designed to 
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases 
in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss 
                                                                                                     
 64. Statutes of limitations set a maximum time after a cause of action 
accrues in which a plaintiff may file suit. In the usual case, accrual occurs when 
the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief, such as when an injury was incurred 
or discovered. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014) 
(explaining statutes of limitations and when they accrue). For a credit card debt, 
the debt owner’s cause of action accrues when the debtor made his or her last 
payment on the account. See Knighten v. Palisades Collections, LLC, 721 F. Supp. 
2d 1261, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that credit card debt collection actions 
have a four-year statute of limitations in Florida); McCollough v. Johnson, 
Rodenberg & Lauinger, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Mont. 2008) (stating that 
credit card debt collection actions have a five-year statute of limitations in 
Montana), aff’d sub nom. McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 
637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011); Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLS, No. 07 C 410, 2008 
WL 94798, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (noting that the statute of limitations 
period on a credit card debt in Illinois “commences with either the charge off date 
or the last date of payment,” and finding accrual based on the date of the last 
payment, which was more recent). 
 65. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 42 
(discussing common statutes of limitations for debt collection actions); see also 
Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High Stakes World of Debt Collection 
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 750 (2006) (noting that debtors face 
frustration in dealing with creditor attempts to collect time-barred debts). 
 66. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 750–51 (discussing the effect of debt 
acknowledgment). 
 67. See Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (discussing the 
history of statutes of limitations). 
 68. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).  
 69. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). 
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of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, 
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”70 
Given the policies underlying statutes of limitations, many 
courts have held that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing 
suit to collect a debt that appears to be time-barred.71 Collectors 
have found at least two ways around this restriction. First, because 
most debtors do not defend suits on time-barred debts and 
consequently do not raise the statute of limitations defense, some 
collectors still file such suits hoping the debtor will not defend, a 
scenario that almost always leads to a default judgment against 
the debtor.72 Second, and more troubling, a debt collector can 
sidestep the FDCPA prohibition against suing on a time-barred 
debt, as well as the possibility of having a collection suit dismissed 
as untimely, by taking advantage of laws that reset the time to sue 
on an old debt.73 
A. The Partial Payment Rule 
Even if the statute of limitations on a debt has run, courts 
generally agree that a debtor’s unqualified acknowledgment of a 
debt implies a new promise to pay it, even if the debtor does not 
expressly promise to do so, thereby restarting the statute of 
limitations on the debt.74 This rule rests on the notion that the 
running of the statute of limitations merely “suspends” the ability 
to enforce the debt in court and does not discharge the underlying 
                                                                                                     
 70.  Id.; see also Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1901) 
(explaining the value and history of statutes of limitations). 
 71. See infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text (discussing penalties for 
debt collectors who try to collect time-barred debts).  
 72. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 745 (“Defendants often 
default . . . because they fail to understand the complaint or because they concede 
defeat, unaware of possible defenses.”) (quotation omitted). 
 73. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 750–51 (noting that some states restart 
the statute of limitations when a debtor acknowledges a time-barred debt). 
 74. See 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:77 (4th ed.) (noting doctrine is “well 
settled in most jurisdictions”); see also Hart, 8 A.2d at 87 (discussing English 
common law authorities on the acknowledgment rule and concluding that an 
acknowledgment of an existing debt “must be ‘unqualified and unconditional’ in 
order to imply a promise to pay and thus remove the bar of the Statute [of 
Limitations]”). 
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debt itself, and reflects the “valid public policy to encourage 
debtors to make payments on obligations that are due but the 
collection of which is barred by a limitations period.”75 For these 
reasons, once a debt is acknowledged or a new promise to pay the 
debt is made, the statute of limitations bar is removed and the 
ability to enforce the debt is restored.76  
In most jurisdictions, a debt can be acknowledged either 
through an express acknowledgment, which should generally be 
made in writing,77 or through a payment on the debt.78 Thus, a 
debtor who makes a $10 payment on a $3,000 time-barred debt will 
revive the statute of limitations as to the entire balance, allowing 
suit to recover that amount for years to come. As one Delaware 
court noted, “[t]he acknowledgment, written or oral, is an 
admission by word; the part payment is an admission by fact.”79 
Although different in form, in both types of admissions, “the law 
                                                                                                     
 75. O’Malley v. Frazier, 49 P.3d 438, 444 (Kan. 2002). 
 76. See DRFP L.L.C. v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 151 F. Supp. 3d 
809, 825 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (examining the common law history of the 
acknowledgment of a debt rule). 
 77. See, e.g., Nesbit v. Galleher, 5 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Va. 1939) (finding debtor’s 
letter in response to a request for payment of a legal fee she incurred, which stated 
that she did not have the money at that time to pay the debt, constituted a new 
promise in writing sufficient to overcome the statute of limitations defense). State 
statutes sometimes impose the requirement of a written acknowledgment, but 
such statutory requirements do not alter the partial payment rule. See, e.g., NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-216 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-36 (2017) (stating that debt 
acknowledgments must be made in writing). 
 78. See, e.g., Keota Mills & Elevator v. Gamble, 243 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Okla. 
2010) (recognizing that since 1910, the general rule in Oklahoma is that a partial 
payment on a debt extends or revives the applicable statute of limitations on the 
debt) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 101); O’Malley v. Frazier, 49 P.3d 438, 443–44 
(Kan. 2002) (recognizing that under Kansas law, partial payment on a debt serves 
as a voluntary acknowledgment which implies a new promise to pay the debt); 
Hickerson v. Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 625 (Colo. 2014) (recognizing that Colorado’s 
partial payment doctrine “has been part of our common law jurisprudence since 
at least 1883” and that, “under this doctrine, where a debtor voluntarily makes a 
payment, the payment constitutes a promise to pay the remaining debt and 
operates to restart the statute of limitations period”); Pear v. Grand Forks Motel 
Assoc., 553 N.W.2d 774, 782–83 (N.D. 1996) (recognizing that under North 
Dakota law, any payment of principal or interest on a debt renews the statute of 
limitations on the entire debt).  
 79. Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939). 
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implies a promise to pay,” thereby lifting the statute of limitations 
bar.80  
Importantly, courts have cautioned that a partial payment on 
a debt does not automatically revive the statute of limitations, as 
the payment must involve circumstances from which the law will 
imply a clear promise to pay the entire debt.81 In one such case, 
Roth v. Michelson,82 the Court of Appeals of New York considered 
whether a debtor’s payment in 1973 toward a mortgage he 
assumed in 1960, and for which he had made only one previous 
payment twelve years earlier, was sufficient to revive the creditor’s 
cause of action against the debtor.83 Finding that it was, the court 
noted that the debtor’s check contained the legend, “payment 
against mortgage, 14 Hamilton Avenue” (the address of the 
mortgaged premises), and was accompanied by a note stating that 
it is “my hope for the future and my determination to make good 
ALL of my debts, particularly my debt to you two.”84 Under these 
circumstances, the promise to pay the entire debt was inferred, and 
the plaintiff’s cause of action against the debtor was revived.85  
In other cases, courts have refused to apply the partial 
payment rule where a debtor imposes strict conditions on 
repayment. In Gillingham v. Brown,86 for example, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that where a partial 
payment is made conditioned on paying the balance by 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. (“In each case when the acknowledgment or part payment is 
direct and unconditional and the surrounding circumstances are such that the 
law implies a promise to pay, then the bar of the Statute [of Limitations] is 
lifted.”); see also Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1901) (examining 
English authorities and concluding that “if [an alleged] acknowledgment be 
accompanied by circumstances, or words which repel the idea of an intention to 
pay, no promise can be implied”); Hart, 8 A.2d at 87 (noting acknowledgment of 
existing debt “must be ‘unqualified and unconditional’ in order to imply a promise 
to pay,” “an acknowledgment . . . which expressly negatives the promise to pay 
has no effect,” and “[w]hen a promise to pay cannot be plainly drawn from all the 
surrounding circumstances the acknowledgment is ineffective”). 
 82. 55 N.Y.2d 278 (1982). 
 83. Id. at 280. 
 84. Id. at 282 (emphasis in original). 
 85. See id. at 282–83 (explaining that the defendant’s statements and 
payment were sufficient to renew the statute of limitations). 
 86. 60 N.E. 122 (Mass. 1901).  
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installments, the plaintiff’s only remedy was to recover the 
installments as they became due (rather than the full amount of 
the debt).87 In another case, Markiewicz v. Toton,88 the same court 
considered whether a $40 payment the defendant made on his debt 
of $1,824.80 was intended to be an unconditional promise to pay 
the full balance, or whether the defendant had conditioned the 
payment upon paying only $5 or $10 a week, if he had the money.89 
Finding questions of fact on that issue, the appellate court reversed 
the trial court’s application of the partial payment rule and ordered 
a new trial in the case.90 
Gillingham and Markiewicz each involved evidence that the 
debtor’s payment did not reflect a clear promise to pay the entire 
debt. These cases indicate that a waiver of the statute of 
limitations “must be taken as it is,” either “absolute, if absolute,” 
or “conditional, if conditional.”91 However, the debtor’s intent is not 
always easy to decipher.  
In cases where there is no evidence regarding the debtor’s 
intent, courts will often apply the partial payment rule in its 
absolute form.92 Thus, a partial payment will be considered an 
acknowledgment of the entire debt “in the absence . . . of anything 
to the contrary,” thereby implying a promise to pay the entire 
amount.93 This is particularly true in the case of credit card debt,94 
allowing collectors to use the rule to easily avoid the statute of 
limitations bar. 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. at 124 (finding that conditional waivers cannot also be absolute). 
 88. 198 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1935).  
 89. See id. at 659–60 (stating the facts and issue of the case). 
 90. See id. at 660–61 (reversing and ordering a new trial). 
 91. Gillingham, 60 N.E. at 124. 
 92. See Nutter v. Mroczka, 21 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Mass. 1939) (“But in the 
absence, as here, of anything to the contrary such a part payment is an 
acknowledgment of the obligation and implies a promise of payment thereof 
which interrupts the running of the statute.”).  
 93. Id. 
 94. See Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 26 N.E.3d 269, 276 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2014) (“Typically, the making of a partial payment on [a credit card account] 
before the statute of limitations expires extends the implied promise to pay the 
balance owed amount, acting to renew the statute of limitations period.” (citing 
Himelfarb v. Am. Express Co., 484 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1984))). 
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B. Debt Collector Use of the Partial Payment Rule 
When a debtor receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt, a 
debtor who wishes to pay off the debt, but cannot afford to pay the 
full settlement amount at that time, often makes a small payment 
as an installment. In states like Massachusetts, where a partial 
payment serves as an acknowledgment of the debt given no 
evidence to the contrary, such a payment revives the statute of 
limitations on the debt and makes the debtor liable for the entire 
amount.95  
Because the average debtor is almost certainly unaware of the 
partial payment rule,96 courts have routinely lamented this 
result.97 Making matters worse, in their written settlement offers, 
collectors usually fail to convey that a debt is time-barred and that 
a partial payment on the debt, however small, will revive the 
statute of limitations on the debt and permit recovery of the entire 
balance.98 Some collectors go one step further, deliberately 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Nutter, 21 N.E.2d at 983 (discussing when a partial payment revives 
the statute of limitations). 
 96. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 19 (“Concepts related 
to statutes of limitations are challenging for consumers to understand, especially 
the fact that in some jurisdictions consumers may ‘revive’ a debt and reset the 
statute of limitations by making a partial payment or acknowledging the debt in 
writing.”). 
 97. In Buchanan, for example, dissenting Judge Kethledge declared:  
There remains, as the majority points out, an equitable point—that if 
a debtor sends a creditor less than the settlement amount, then under 
Michigan law (and that of many states) the limitations period runs 
anew and the debt becomes enforceable again in court. Virtually no 
one, save the creditors themselves, would welcome that result. 
Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(Kethledge, J., dissenting). 
 98. Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR 67876 
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006); see, e.g., Buchanan, 
776 F.3d at 395–96 (examining an offer to settle a time-barred debt where the 
collection letter failed to mention that the state’s statute of limitations had run 
on the debt or that a partial payment on a time-barred debt restarts the statute 
of limitations); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 510 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (same); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020–22 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (considering two cases that involved a collection letter offering to settle 
a time-barred debt without notifying the debtor that the applicable statute of 
limitations on the debt had expired or that a partial payment may make the 
debtor vulnerable to a suit on the full amount of the debt). 
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attempting to “dupe” consumers into acknowledging a debt 
through collection techniques such as detachable return stubs in 
demand letters that offer debtors different payment options on a 
debt.99 
To combat these deceptive tactics, some states, including 
North Carolina, have enacted statutes making it unlawful for a 
debt collector to seek a written acknowledgment of any 
time-barred debt without disclosing the consequences of an 
acknowledgment.100 Although such warnings are a step in the right 
direction, statutes like the North Carolina statute simply set forth 
requirements for written acknowledgments and do not alter the 
rules relating to acknowledgments accomplished via partial 
payment.101 As such, even in states that seek to ensure that 
acknowledgments are intelligently made, greater protections are 
needed.  
IV. Option 3: No Response by Debtor, Leading to Collector Suits 
Against Debtors 
A. The Prevalence of Default Judgments Against Debtors 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 349 (“One such technique is to include 
detachable return stubs in demand letters . . . . When a consumer returns the 
stub even without any payment, the consumer may have acknowledged the 
debt . . . .”) (citing Richard Rubin, FDCPA Claims Arising Out of State Court 
Collection Litigation, CONSUMER ADVOC., Sept. 2008, at 19). 
 100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-70-115(1) (2017) (barring debt collectors from 
seeking acknowledgments without disclosing the consequences of doing so); see 
also Jenkins v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, No. 5:10CV27-RLV, 2013 WL 589006, at 
*5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2013) (recognizing that “§ 58–70–115(1) was meant to keep 
collection agencies from luring unsuspecting consumers into reviving the expired 
statute of limitations by obtaining written acknowledgments of time-barred 
debts”). 
 101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-26 (“No acknowledgment or promise is evidence 
of a new or continuing contract, from which the statutes of limitations run, unless 
it is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this 
section does not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.”); see also 
Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 122 S.E. 377, 378 (N.C. 1924) (recognizing that the North 
Carolina statute requiring acknowledgments to be in writing “does not restrict or 
modify in any way the effect of a payment under the general principles prevailing 
in this jurisdiction when the statute was enacted”). 
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Most debt collection litigation occurs in state court.102 
Hundreds and sometimes thousands of third-party debt collection 
cases are filed in any given county every year, representing a 
significant percentage of a state court’s docket.103 A 2010 New York 
Times article, for example, reported that in 2009, about 96,000 
consumer debt collection cases were filed in California’s Alameda, 
Contra Costa, and San Francisco Counties alone, a significant 
increase from the 53,665 cases filed in 2007.104 This trend is not 
limited to California. The FTC has concluded, for example, that 
“[t]he majority of cases on many state court dockets on a given day 
often are debt collection matters.”105 The sheer number106 and 
complexity107 of debt collection cases has overwhelmed some 
courts, providing a natural incentive for courts to grant default 
                                                                                                     
 102. Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR 67848 
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). Some debt collection 
litigation occurs in federal court and some occurs in small claims court. See Fox, 
supra note 2, at 356–57 (reporting that national debt collection firms often engage 
in forum shopping in Indiana by filing low-dollar debt collection actions in Circuit 
Court rather than small claims court). 
 103. See William Joseph Bearden, Employing the Prima Facie Standard in 
Third Party Debt Collection Default Judgments, 48 URB. LAW. 365, 366 (2016) 
(“These cases usually account for a significant percentage of cases within any 
given jurisdiction . . . .”).  
 104. Yeung, supra note 30. 
 105. CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 18. 
 106. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1148 (reporting that, “[s]ince the mid-2000s, 
the Civil Court of the City of New York has been overwhelmed by debt collection 
lawsuits,” and noting that between 2006 and 2008, debt collectors filed 
approximately 300,000 lawsuits per year in New York); Yeung, supra note 30 
(reporting the opinion of Fred W. Schwinn of the Consumer Law Center that 
“[c]reditors and debt buyers are swamping the California court system with 
debt-collection cases”). 
 107. When debtors do defend, the burden on the judiciary is compounded, not 
only by the complexity of some debt collection cases, such as those involving the 
circuit split described in Part V below, but also by the fact that even 
run-of-the-mill suits can quickly become complex. As one court stated in a recent 
debt collection action: “Despite starting from the deceptively simple origins of an 
action arising from a consumer debt, this case became unduly complicated, in part 
brought upon by the parties’ inability to accurately set forth the facts as presented 
in the documentary evidence.” Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 26 N.E.3d 
269, 274 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
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judgments when possible simply to clear cases from their 
dockets.108 
The protection that statutes of limitations provide to 
consumers is not automatic. Instead, the running of the statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense that consumers must raise 
before courts will dismiss a collection suit.109 However, 70% to 95% 
of consumers sued in debt collection actions do not defend such 
suits, likely because they lack the financial ability to do so, and 
therefore never assert the statute of limitations defense.110 
Moreover, because the defense is waived unless asserted, courts do 
not require a plaintiff to prove a debt is not time-barred where the 
defendant does not raise the defense. As a result, suits on 
time-barred debts often result in default judgments being awarded 
against debtors, perhaps in as many as 90% of such cases, even 
                                                                                                     
 108. For the federal courts, the Civil Justice Reform Act requires semiannual 
reports, available to the public, that disclose for each federal judge “(1) the 
number of motions on the judge’s docket that have been pending for more than 
six months; (2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more than 
six months; and (3) the number of cases that have not been terminated within 
three years after filing.” 28 U.S.C. § 476 (1990). This reporting requirement 
creates a natural incentive for judges to clear cases from their dockets, 
particularly those that are easily resolved (as with default judgments). See R. 
Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, 
Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687, 702–03 (1993) (summarizing judicial 
attitudes indicating how CJRA reporting requirements provide incentives for 
judges to dispose of cases more quickly). 
 109. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (“Ordinarily in civil 
litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s 
answer or in an amendment thereto.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c), 12(b), 15(a) 
(laying out how defendants must assert the running of a statute of limitations). 
 110. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 45 
(reporting that “90% or more of consumers sued in [debt collection] actions do not 
appear in court to defend”); Duffy, supra note 1, at 1148 n.2 (reporting that in 
2011, 134,423 consumer cases were filed in the Civil Court of the City of New 
York, and that of these cases, 107,618 went unanswered, 70,371 resulted in 
default judgments, and attorneys represented consumer defendants in only 3,342 
cases); Yeung, supra note 30 (“According to debt-collection industry estimates, 
between 75 and 80 percent of debtors in these cases do not respond to their 
lawsuits, and 95 percent of these result in default judgments.”); Mary Spector, 
Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on 
Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 288, 296 (2011) (reporting on 
the low numbers of defendants who appear for debt collection cases; nearly 80% 
of defendants do not defend suits, and nearly 40% of cases result in a default 
judgment). 
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though most debtors could have the case dismissed through 
minimal litigation efforts.111 With the addition of interest, 
litigation costs, and attorney’s fees, the result can be a judgment 
against the debtor of more than 300% of the amount originally 
owed.112 Thereafter, “post-judgment remedies may include 
property seizure, residential liens, and wage garnishment.”113  
B. Default Judgments Against Debtors: The Root Causes 
According to professor Victoria Haneman, “[b]ringing a 
lawsuit on [a time-barred] debt is . . . nothing but bluffing,” which, 
although perhaps acceptable between attorneys, is simply 
“unsporting and coercive” against unrepresented laypersons.114 
Nevertheless, such suits regularly occur, and often result in 
default judgments against debtors.115 There are at least three root 
causes for this: aggressive litigation practices by debt owners and 
collectors, overly-relaxed judicial standards in default cases, and 
professional ethics rules that encourage rather than prevent such 
suits.116  
To take advantage of the prevalence of default judgments on 
time-barred debts, debt buyers often maintain a network of 
attorneys through whom default judgments are sought.117 Even 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Roth v. Michelson, 55 N.Y.2d 278, 280–82 (N.Y. 1982) (explaining 
that payment on a time-barred debt can restart the statute of limitations); see 
also Haneman, supra note 7, at 722 (reporting that “[d]efault is by far the most 
common action [in suits involving time-barred debts], occurring in 70% to 90% of 
all cases”). 
 112. Haneman, supra note 7, at 717. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 709. 
 115. See id. at 709–10 (“The result, most often, is a judgment against the 
consumer debtor who typically defaults or, less typically, appears pro se but 
without the knowledge or skill to use the statute effectively within the narrow 
‘raise it or waive it’ time.”). 
 116. See id. at 707 (“The professional ethics of the American bar overtly 
permit attorneys to knowingly exploit the ignorance and inexperience of 
unrepresented litigants.”). 
 117. See id. at 716 (“Debt-buyers are relying more heavily upon legal actions 
than ever before, often maintaining nationwide networks of attorneys to whom 
accounts are referred and by whom lawsuits are filed and remedies pursued.”). 
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without the evidence needed to secure judgment, these attorneys 
bring extremely large numbers of such suits knowing they will only 
need to provide account records in the few cases, about 10%, where 
the defendant actually appears.118 Although most cases end in 
default judgment due to debtors failing to defend, in cases where a 
defense is mounted, the collector’s usual response is to simply 
dismiss the suit.119  
Based on these practices, some law firms have been deemed 
debt collection “litigation mills,” filing tens of thousands of debt 
collection suits every year with minimal attorney involvement and 
very little documentation on individual accounts.120 One such law 
firm, for example, filed over 350,000 lawsuits in Georgia from 2009 
to 2013 to recover on allegedly defaulted debt.121 Another law firm 
filed nearly 3,000 such lawsuits in Montana alone from January 
2007 to July 2008.122 
Once suit is filed, existing procedural rules governing default 
judgments make it likely that collector suits on time-barred debts 
will receive little attention and thus simply fall through the 
judicial cracks. Having served as a judicial clerk for several years, 
where I worked on numerous cases resulting in default judgments 
against defendants who failed to defend, there can be no doubt 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Bearden, supra note 103, at 372–74 (“Since 90% of defendants in 
these cases typically do not appear . . . . [Plaintiffs’ attorneys] know that a large 
percentage of . . . debtors will default in court.”); see also Edward J. Halper & 
Rachel L. Schaller, Credit Card Collection Suits: Life Preservers for Illinois 
Consumers, 100 ILL. B.J. 360, 386 (2012) (“The debt collection industry does not 
want to incur substantial time and expense in proving its case—even if it can.”). 
 119. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 
114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348–50 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (describing one law firm’s debt 
collection litigation practices). 
 120. See id. at 1366 (describing “litigation mills” as law firms with very little 
attorney involvement in each case). 
 121. See id. at 1349 (involving a creditors’ rights law firm that filed over 
350,000 lawsuits in Georgia from 2009 to 2013 to recover on allegedly defaulted 
debt). 
 122. See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 
945, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the firm filed 2,700 collection actions in 
Montana from January 2007 to July 2008 and that approximately 90% of the 
firm’s case filings result in default judgment, and describing testimony regarding 
one Montana law firm’s “factory” approach of “mass producing default judgments” 
in debt collection actions). 
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that courts take a more relaxed approach when ruling on motions 
for default judgment (as compared to a contested motion for 
summary judgment, for example). Indeed, current rules of 
procedure, such as Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, all but require such treatment.123 According to one 
commentator, judicial practices in debt collection litigation “often 
result in a practical presumption that the plaintiff has a right to 
collect, often without even providing any evidence that the debt 
is valid and the plaintiff is the legitimate holder of the debt.”124 
Such relaxed judicial standards only exacerbate the bad habits of 
debt buyers and their attorneys,125 such as inadequate account 
documentation and poor case preparation.126  
Along with aggressive attorney tactics and relaxed judicial 
standards, legal ethics rules are partly to blame for collector suits 
on time-barred debts. In most states, attorneys are governed by 
rules of ethics that are based on the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.127 In a 1994 formal opinion interpreting the 
ABA Model Rules, the ABA Ethics Committee determined that 
filing suit on a time-barred debt is generally not unethical. 
Considering both a lawyer’s duty not to file a “frivolous” lawsuit 
under Rule 3.1 and the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal 
set forth in Rule 3.3, the opinion concludes that “it is generally not 
                                                                                                     
 123. See infra Part VII.D (proposing that the burden of proof for statutes of 
limitation be flipped to the plaintiff in debt collection cases); see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 55 (providing rules for default judgments). 
 124. Bearden, supra note 103, at 372; see also In re Assigned Consumer Debt 
Default Judgment Applications., Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-
1546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-
2663, 2015 WL 1087512, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 6, 2015) (stating that, before 
a Minnesota statute was enacted to tighten the standards for awarding default 
judgments in consumer debt suits, the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office 
encountered cases where plaintiffs faced serious injustices).  
 125. See Bearden, supra note 103, at 372 (“This nearly complete absence of 
any burden of proof on plaintiff[s] has allowed practices to flourish in the debt 
buying industry that may support a lackadaisical approach to litigation . . . .”). 
 126. See id. at 372–73 (explaining why plaintiffs often lack information in 
debt collection actions). 
 127. See Haneman, supra note 7, at 727 (“Some version of the ABA Model 
Rules has been adopted by forty-four states and the District of Columbia.”). 
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a violation of either of these rules to file a time-barred lawsuit, so 
long as this does not violate the law of the relevant jurisdiction.”128 
Underlying this opinion is the notion that affirmative 
defenses, such as the running of the statute of limitations, are 
waived unless asserted,129 coupled with the assumption of the 
American adversarial system that justice will prevail when 
roughly equal advocates on both sides of a dispute advocate 
zealously on behalf of their clients.130 Because so many debtors fail 
to defend suits on time-barred debts, however, this assumption 
simply does not apply here, creating a systemic flaw available to 
those willing to exploit it.131  
Whether through attorney self-regulation, changes to rules of 
ethics, or statutory reforms, collectors should not be allowed to use 
the courts to convert old debts into enforceable judgments that far 
exceed the amount of the original debt. Accordingly, reforms are 
necessary to reduce the number of default judgments in suits 
involving time-barred debts.  
                                                                                                     
 128. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Disclosure to Opposing 
Party and Court that Statute of Limitations Has Run, ABA Formal Op. 94-387 
(1994). 
 129. See id. (recognizing that “[t]he result under Rules 3.1 and 3.3 might well 
be different if the limitations defect in the claim were jurisdictional, and thus 
affected the court’s power to adjudicate the suit”).  
 130. See Haneman, supra note 7, at 728 (“To understand the philosophical 
foundations that support the ABA’s long held position requires looking no further 
than the influence of the premises of adversarial justice on the codes of 
professional conduct.”). 
 131. The possibility of default judgments being awarded against a debtor 
defendant due to a failure to defend, despite the availability of a winning defense, 
is not limited to the statute of limitations defense. Professor Mary Spector, for 
example, has reported that in 38 of 507 cases initiated by debt buyers against 
consumers to collect delinquent credit card debt in Dallas County, Texas, the 
plaintiff failed to comply with Texas law requiring debt collectors to file a bond 
and did not have active bonds on file for the calendar year at issue, which violated 
Texas state law. Spector, supra note 110, at 280. Yet, not one defendant in the 38 
cases she examined actually raised those claims, and only two defendants even 
appeared. Id. at 281. Moreover, because her study involved a limited sample of 
cases, Professor Spector estimates that unbonded debt buyers filed about 1,200 
cases during 2007 in Dallas County Courts-at-Law alone. Id. at 280–81. Had any 
of the plaintiffs raised the issue, they might have been able to avoid the suits 
altogether or even obtain statutory damages for the debt collectors’ conduct. Id. 
at 281. 
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V. Option 4: Debtor Suits Against Collectors for FDCPA 
Violations 
The FDCPA is enforced through both administrative action 
and private lawsuits. Although administrative enforcement has 
been extensive,132 with respect to private suits, which is the focus 
of this Article, the FDCPA makes debt collectors who fail to comply 
with the statute liable to the individuals affected.133 Successful 
plaintiffs are entitled to “actual damage[s],” plus costs and “a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”134 A court 
may also award “additional damages,” subject to a statutory cap of 
                                                                                                     
 132. On the administrative side, violations of the FDCPA are deemed to be 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 41, et seq. (2012), and are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. 
See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 576 
(2010) (stating that a debt collector can avoid liability for violation of the FDCPA 
if “she can show ‘the violation was not intentional and resulted from a[n] . . . error 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such 
error’”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692l (authorizing the FTC to enforce violations of the 
FDCPA). Under this framework, a debt collector may face penalties of up to 
$10,000 per day for acting with “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on 
the basis of objective circumstances” that the collector’s act is prohibited under 
the FDCPA. See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 573 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C)); 74 
Fed. Reg. 858 (2009) (amending 16 CFR § 1.98(d)). A debt collector is not liable in 
any action brought under the FDCPA, however, if it “shows by a preponderance 
of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide 
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid any such error.” Jerman, 559 U.S. at 573 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)). 
Violations of the FDCPA are also enforced by the CFPB, which shares 
enforcement responsibility with the FTC. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 7. Since the CFPB commenced operations in 2011, it has brought 
more than twenty-five debt collection cases against first- and third-party 
collectors alleging FDCPA violations or unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt 
collection acts and practices in violation of the Dodd-Frank Act. In these cases, 
the Bureau has ordered over $100 million in civil penalties, over $300 million in 
restitution to consumers, and billions of dollars in debt relief to consumers. 
During this same five-year period, the FTC has brought more than forty debt 
collection cases alleging FDCPA violations or unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices in violation of the FTC Act, and states have brought numerous 
additional actions against debt collectors for violating state debt collection and 
consumer protection laws. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 1. 
 133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (providing penalties for violators of the FDCPA, 
including damages for persons affected by the violation). 
 134. Id. § 1692k(a)(1), (3). 
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$1,000 for individual actions, or, for class actions, “the lesser of 
$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector.”135  
In recent years, courts have examined whether a debtor may 
assert an FDCPA claim for (1) actual suits brought by collectors 
against debtors on time-barred debts, (2) threats to sue on such 
debts (without actually filing suit), and (3) offers to settle such 
debts (without any direct threat to sue). Courts generally agree 
that the first two types of actions are prohibited by the FDCPA, 
but are split on the lawfulness of a mere offer to settle a 
time-barred debt in the absence of an explicit threat to sue, with 
the recent trend being that such an act is indeed unlawful.136  
A. Suits Against Debtors on Time-Barred Debts as Violations 
of the FDCPA 
The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection 
with the collection of any debt.”137 The statute contains a 
non-exclusive list of unlawful practices, including falsely 
representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,”138 
“threat[ening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or 
that is not intended to be taken,”139 and using “any . . . deceptive 
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”140 In addition, a 
separate FDCPA provision prohibits collectors from using “unfair 
or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. § 1692k(a)(2). In awarding additional damages, the court must 
consider “the frequency and persistence of [the collector’s] noncompliance,” “the 
nature of such noncompliance,” and “the extent to which such noncompliance was 
intentional.” Id. § 1692k(b). 
 136. See Patrick Lunsford, A Settlement Offer on Time-Barred Debt May 
Violate FDCPA Says Split Sixth Circuit, INSIDE ARM (Jan. 14, 2015, 7:29 AM) 
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00040876-a-settlement-offer-on-time-barred-
debt-ma/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (discussing the Buchanan decision, which 
found that an offer to settle on time-barred debt may violate the FDCPA, and 
noting that this finding is in conflict with Third and Eighth Circuit decisions) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
 138. Id. § 1692e(2)(a). 
 139. Id. § 1692e(5). 
 140. Id. § 1692e(10). 
478 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (2018) 
debt.”141 A consumer only has to prove one violation to trigger 
liability.142  
To curtail collectors from suing on time-barred debts (likely 
hoping to secure default judgments against debtors who fail to 
defend), many courts have held that a debt collector violates the 
FDCPA by filing suit on a debt that appears to be time-barred.143 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. § 1692f. 
 142. Davis v. Trans Union, LLC, 526 F. Supp. 2d 577, 586 (W.D.N.C. 2007) 
(“The FDCPA is a strict liability statute and a consumer only has to prove one 
violation to trigger liability.” (citation and quotation omitted)). Because Congress 
intended the FDCPA to have a “broad remedial scope,” Daugherty v. Convergent 
Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2016), courts normally interpret the 
FDCPA broadly and in the consumer’s favor. Id. When evaluating whether a 
collection letter violates the FDCPA, courts view the letter from the perspective 
of an “unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer,” and assume the debtor is 
neither shrewd nor experienced in dealing with creditors. Id.; see also McMahon 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2014) (viewing the letter 
through the lens of “a person of modest education and limited commercial savvy”); 
Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that 
the FDCPA protects “all consumers,” from the “shrewd” to the “gullible,” “from 
practices that would mislead the ‘reasonable unsophisticated consumer,’ one with 
some level of understanding and one willing to read the document with some 
care”); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(examining this issue at length and concluding that the FDCPA is designed to 
protect the “least sophisticated consumers,” rather than “reasonable consumers” 
who could more readily protect themselves in the market place). 
 143. See, e.g., Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 
1987) (filing time-barred suit violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012)); 
Basile v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 632 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845–
47 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that “[c]ourts have held that the filing of a time-barred 
lawsuit violates the FDCPA;” on the merits, finding that debt collector’s suit was 
time-barred, but that a genuine factual issue existed regarding whether the 
collector could assert the bona fide error defense); Knighten v. Palisades 
Collections, LLC, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that 
lawyers violated the FDCPA by filing a time-barred suit for a party that lacked 
standing, and rejecting lawyers’ attempt to invoke bona fide error defense), 
clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 09-CIV-20051, 2011 WL 835783 (S.D. 
Fla. Mar. 4, 2011); Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 07 C 410, 2008 WL 
94798, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (finding the FDCPA violated by the filing 
of a lawsuit on a time-barred debt); Midland Funding, LLC v. Hottenroth, 26 
N.E.3d 269, 275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (finding a violation of the FDCPA); see also 
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Federal 
circuit and district courts have uniformly held that a debt collector’s threatening 
to sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred suit in state court to 
recover that debt violates §§ 1692e and 1692f.”); Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC 
(In re Dubois), 834 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts have consistently 
held that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing a lawsuit or threatening 
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In a recent opinion, the Ohio Court of Appeals based this decision 
on the FDCPA’s prohibition against falsely representing the 
character or legal status of the debt. According to that court: 
A debt collector violates [the FDCPA] by . . . falsely 
representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any 
debt.” Common sense dictates that whether a debt is 
time-barred is directly related to the legal status of that debt. 
As a result, a debt collector violates the FDCPA in filing a legal 
action based on a time-barred debt.144 
An alternative approach derives from Kimber v. Federal 
Financial Corporation,145 which determined that filing suit on a 
debt that appears to be time-barred is an unfair and 
unconscionable means of collecting the debt under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692f (2012).146 According to the Kimber court, “[b]ecause few 
unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a statute of 
limitations could be used to defend against lawsuits based on stale 
debts, such consumers would unwittingly acquiesce to such 
lawsuits.”147 In addition:  
[E]ven if the consumer realizes that she can use time as a 
defense, she will more than likely still give in rather than fight 
the lawsuit because she must still expend energy and resources 
and subject herself to the embarrassment of going into court to 
present the defense; this is particularly true in light of the costs 
of attorneys today.148  
Rejecting the collector’s rather remarkable argument that its 
attorney was ethically bound to file suit given the possibility that 
the debtor would waive the statute of limitations defense by failing 
to defend, the court relied on cases where sanctions have been 
imposed under Rule 11 for filing suit “where the attorney knew or 
                                                                                                     
to file a lawsuit to collect a time-barred debt.”). 
 144. Midland Funding, LLC, at 275 (internal marks and citations omitted). 
 145. 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987). 
 146. See id. 1487 (“[A] debt collector’s filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears 
to be time-barred, without the debt collector having first determined after a 
reasonable inquiry that that limitations period has been or should be tolled, is an 
unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt.”). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
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should have known a claim was time-barred.”149 As another, more 
recent case put it, to accept such an argument:  
[W]ould permit a lawyer to pursue a claim against an 
unsophisticated consumer on a debt that the consumer no 
longer has a legal obligation to pay in the hopes that the 
consumer’s inexperience and lack of expertise will cause him or 
her to overlook the limitations bar and waive the right to assert 
it. This is precisely the type of deceptive practice that the 
FDCPA was designed to prohibit.150 
As these courts recognize, because the viability of a suit on a 
time-barred debt hinges entirely on suing an unsophisticated 
debtor, the very type of debtor the FDCPA is designed to protect, 
there is simply no merit to the argument that it is proper to file 
such suits.151 
In one particularly egregious case involving a law firm’s filing 
suit against a debtor on a time-barred debt, McCollough v. 
Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC,152 the plaintiff-debtor was 
awarded the $1,000 statutory maximum for an FDCPA violation, 
$250,000 for emotional distress, and $60,000 in punitive 
damages.153 McCollough involved a credit card debt owed by Tim 
McCollough, a former school custodian.154 McCollough had opened 
the account in 1990, and stopped making payments after he 
suffered a brain injury and lost his job.155 When McCollough made 
his last payment in 1999, he owed approximately $3,000.156 In 
2001, after the account was charged off, Collect America, Ltd., and 
its subsidiary, CACV of Colorado, Ltd. (CACV), purchased 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 1488 (citing Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1985)).  
 150. Ehsanuddin v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. CIV A 06-708, 2007 WL 543052, 
at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007). 
 151. See Kimber, 668 F. Supp. At 1488 (“[Debt Collector’s] argument that its 
attorney was ethically authorized to pursue the collections in case the debtors 
failed to raise the statute of limitations defense lacks authority.”). 
 152. 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 153. See id. at 947, 958 (reporting the jury’s verdict and affirming the district 
court’s decision not to overturn the jury’s verdict or order a new trial). 
 154. Id. at 944. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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McCollough’s account.157 CACV sued McCollough in 2005 for 
$3,816.80 to collect the debt.158 Representing himself, McCollough 
replied that the “statute of limitations is up,” prompting CACV to 
dismiss the suit two weeks later.159 
Although CACV had documented the results of its 2005 suit 
against McCollough in its electronic files, in 2006, Collect America 
retained Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC (JRL), a law firm 
specializing in debt collection, to pursue collection of McCollough’s 
debt.160 McCollough’s case was just one of several thousand such 
cases for the firm.161 From January 2007 through July 2008, JRL 
filed 2,700 collection lawsuits in Montana alone, representing 
about five lawsuits filed per day, with about 90% of those suits 
resulting in default judgment.162 
After CACV transmitted information about McCollough’s 
account to JRL, the law firm flagged a potential statute of 
limitations problem with the debt.163 Likely referencing the partial 
payment rule (and illustrating how collectors use it to circumvent 
the statute of limitations), in January 2007, a JRL attorney wrote 
to CACV: “It appears that the Statute of Limitations has expired 
on this file. . . . If you can[,] provide us with an instrument in 
writing to extend the Statute of Limitations.”164 A few weeks later, 
CACV responded in an e-mail, entitled “sol extended,” that 
McCollough had made a $75 partial payment on June 30, 2004, 
thereby extending the applicable five-year statute of limitations to 
2009.165 No such payment, however, had been made.166  
                                                                                                     
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 944–45. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 945. 
 165. Id. (citing Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Story, 862 P.2d 1120, 1122 
(Mont. 1993) (holding that Montana’s five-year statute of limitation on an account 
stated commences running from the date of the last payment)). 
 166. According to the court, McCollough had not made a partial payment on 
June 30, 2004. Rather, as reflected in CACV’s electronic file, the event that took 
place on June 30, 2004, was the return of court costs to CACV for a collection 
complaint and summons that CACV had prepared in 2003. Id. 
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In April 2007, JRL sued McCollough in Montana state court. 
The complaint sought judgment for an account balance of 
$3,816.80, interest of $5,536.81, attorney’s fees of $481.68, and 
court costs of $120.00.167 At that point, the file for McCollough’s 
debt indicated the year 2000 charge-off date; a June 30, 2004, entry 
indicating the return of court costs (rather than a partial payment 
on the account); and an entry showing that CACV had previously 
sued McCollough, who had asserted the statute of limitations 
defense.168 The attorney who filed the suit admitted that he did not 
seek to determine whether a partial payment had, in fact, occurred 
on June 30, 2004.169  
In June 2007, McCollough filed a pro se answer to the 
complaint, asserting a statute of limitations defense which stated, 
in part:  
FORGIVE MY SPELLING I HAVE A HEAD INJURY AND 
WRITING DOSE NOT COME EASY 
(1) THE STACUT OF LIMITACION'S IS UP, I HAVE NOT 
HAD ANY DEALINGS WITH ANY CREDITED CARD IN 
WELL OVER 8 ½ YEARS 
(2) I AM DISABLED . . . .170 
In July, McCollough also called JRL and left a message 
indicating that he would be seeking summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations.171 The next month, CACV informed the 
firm that McCollough had not actually made a payment on June 
30, 2004.172 Nevertheless, the firm continued to pursue the case. 
In October 2007, the firm served McCollough twenty-two 
requests for admission that included the following: 
11. Prior to initiation of this suit, Defendant Tim M. 
McCollough has never notified plaintiff or any other party in 
interest in this action of any disputes regarding said Chase 
Manhattan Bank credit card. 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 945–46. 
 171. Id. at 946. 
 172. Id. 
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 . . . . 
14. There are no facts upon which Defendant Tim M. 
McCollough relies as a basis for defense in this action. 
 . . . . 
17. Every statement or allegation contained in plaintiff’s 
Complaint is true and correct. 
. . . . 
21. Defendant Tim M. McCollough made a payment on said 
Chase Manhattan Bank credit card on or about June 30, 2004 
in the amount of $75.00.173  
The firm did not notify McCollough that its requests would be 
deemed admitted if he did not respond within thirty days.174 
Luckily for McCollough, he retained counsel and timely denied all 
of JRL’s requests. A few weeks later, CACV instructed JRL to 
dismiss the suit “asap” because of the “SOL problem.”175 JRL then 
moved for dismissal with prejudice, which the state court 
granted.176  
At this point, McCollough went on the offensive. McCollough 
sued JRL for violations of the FDCPA and the Montana Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, adding state law 
claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.177 On 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that 
JRL pursued the action against McCollough for over four months 
after it had obtained information demonstrating that the suit was 
time-barred.178 The case then proceeded to jury trial, resulting in 
a verdict for McCollough and an award exceeding $300,000.179 
Although McCollough’s case represents an extreme example, 
it illustrates the mindset of many collection firms and the dangers 
that all debtors face in defending aggressive collection actions. Had 
                                                                                                     
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 947. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. The district court granted McCollough partial summary judgment on 
his FDCPA claims, and the jury found in his favor on all remaining claims. 
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McCollough not defended JRL’s collections suit, the case would 
have no doubt ended in a default judgment against him. Rather 
than recovering nearly $300,000, McCollough would have been 
saddled with a judgment exceeding $10,000. 
Aside from judicial interpretations of the FDCPA, some states, 
such as North Carolina, have enacted statutes to prohibit the filing 
of a consumer collection action on the basis of a debt the plaintiff 
knows or should know is time-barred.180 Such statutes and judicial 
rulings can be powerful tools towards preventing suits on 
time-barred debts. In its 2013 study of the debt buying industry, 
the FTC determined that “[d]ebt buyers generally know the ages 
of debts they are collecting,” noting further that “[i]nformation 
provided to debt buyers . . . generally included the age of the 
debt.”181 Accordingly, in states like North Carolina, debt buyers are 
on notice that initiating suits on time-barred debts is usually 
unlawful. Similarly, in jurisdictions that have deemed the FDCPA 
violated by filing suit on a debt that appears to be time-barred, 
debt collectors who proceed with suits on such debts potentially 
subject themselves to large financial penalties under the statute.182  
Going one step further, some courts have held that a debt 
collector may violate the FDCPA not only by filing suit on a 
time-barred debt, but by simply threatening to do so. 
B. Threats to Sue on Time-Barred Debts as Violations 
of the FDCPA 
The FDCPA makes it unlawful to “threat[en] to take any 
action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be 
taken.”183 Invoking this provision, courts have held that debt 
                                                                                                     
 180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-115(4) (2017) (“When the collection 
agency is a debt buyer or is acting on behalf of a debt buyer, bringing 
suit . . . against the debtor or otherwise attempting to collect on a debt when the 
collection agency knows, or reasonably should know, that such collection is barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations.”). 
 181. FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at v. 
 182. Such penalties could be imposed under 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C) 
(2012). 
 183. Id. § 1692e(5). 
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collectors may violate the FDCPA by threatening to sue on 
time-barred debt.184  
According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), threats of unlawful action by collectors are quite common. 
In 2015, the CFPB handled 85,200 total debt collection complaints 
pertaining to collectors, which were grouped into categories.185 The 
most common complaint the CFPB received in 2015 involved 
attempts to collect a debt that was reportedly not owed.186 Taking 
or threatening an illegal action constituted 11% of the total 
number of complaints, with 28% of the complaints within that 
category—more than 2,500—involving threats to sue on a debt 
that is too old.187  
Because the statute of limitations defense is waived if not 
asserted, it is possible to file suit on a time-barred debt and simply 
wait to see whether the opponent raises that defense. As such, 
merely threatening to file suit on a time-barred debt arguably does 
not trigger the FDCPA’s prohibition against threatening to take 
any action—i.e., filing suit—that “cannot legally be taken.”188 
Nevertheless, as the United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware aptly stated, “the threatening of a lawsuit which the 
debt collector knows or should know is unavailable or unwinnable 
by reason of a legal bar such as the statute of limitations is the 
kind of abusive practice the FDCPA was intended to eliminate.”189 
For this reason, the court found that uttering a threat over the 
telephone to sue the debtor on a time-barred debt might violate the 
FDCPA.190 
Other courts have found FDCPA violations in cases involving 
much more subtle threats to sue. For example, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found a 
                                                                                                     
 184. See supra Part V.A (exploring examples of FDCPA violations). 
 185. 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. 
 186. See id. (noting that 40% of debt collection attempts were continued 
attempts to collect a debt not owed). 
 187. Id. 
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 189. Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Del. 1991).  
 190. See id. (denying summary judgment to defendant-collector on the 
debtor’s FDCPA claim due to questions of fact regarding whether the defendant 
actually uttered a threat over the telephone to sue the debtor). 
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collection letter’s warning of “further collection action” sufficient to 
state a claim for deceptive practices in violation of the FDCPA.191 
Likewise, the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut determined that a law firm’s letter alluding to a 
“client” who has “retained” the “law firm” to “collect” in the context 
of an “important legal matter” would cause the typical consumer 
to believe that litigation was imminent.192 According to the court, 
such “vague legal references in the context of debt collection,” 
particularly when made by an attorney on law firm letterhead, can 
strike fear in the least sophisticated consumer and may induce the 
debtor to make a payment on the account, thereby triggering the 
partial payment rule.193 
Courts have also considered whether a collector’s simple 
attempt to collect on a time-barred debt through a collection letter 
is, in and of itself, a veiled threat to sue. On this issue, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management194 
determined that “a debt collector [may] seek voluntary repayment 
of [a] time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not initiate 
or threaten legal action,”195 and explained that the question of 
whether a collection letter threatens legal action is determined by 
the language of the letter as examined from the perspective of the 
“least sophisticated debtor.”196 
                                                                                                     
 191. Stepney v. Outsourcing Sols., Inc., No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997). In that case, the defendants argued that because “the 
[underlying] debt obligation is still valid, then the practice of attempting to collect 
the debt—short of filing a time-barred lawsuit—must a fortiori be legitimate.” Id. 
at *4. Citing Kimber, the court rejected the argument (at least for purposes of 
ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss), even though the collection letter at 
issue “neither threaten[ed] nor mention[ed] filing a lawsuit.” Id. at *5.  
 192. Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 270, 273–76 (D. Conn. 
2007). 
 193. Id. at 276; see also id. at 274 (discussing cases declaring that a letter 
signed by an attorney signals to the unsophisticated consumer that legal action 
may be imminent); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 
(C.D. Cal. 1991) (“The representation that independent counsel has been hired 
may unjustifiably frighten the unsophisticated debtor into paying a debt that he 
or she does not owe. The FDCPA must be construed to proscribe this means of 
collection.”). 
 194  641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 195. Id. at 32–33 (emphasis added). 
 196. Id. at 33. 
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Examining the particular letter at issue, the Third Circuit 
found no basis to conclude that the letter explicitly or implicitly 
threatened litigation.197 Rather, the letter merely indicated that 
the debtor’s account had been reassigned; requested the debtor to 
call “to resolve this issue”; included a privacy notice; and indicated, 
as the FDCPA requires, that if the debtor did not dispute the debt 
within thirty days of receiving the letter, the collector would 
assume the debt is valid.198 The letter also warned that it was “an 
attempt to collect a debt,” which the FDCPA requires,199 and, 
importantly, did not offer to settle the debt (a tactic courts in 
similar cases have found unlawful).200 Examining the letter in its 
entirety, the Huertas court declared: 
Since it is appropriate for a debt collector to request voluntary 
repayment of a time-barred debt, it would be unfair if debt 
collectors were found to violate the FDCPA both if they include 
the mandated [notices and warnings] (because inclusion would 
threaten suit) and if they do not (because failure to include a 
mandatory notice violates the statute). Accordingly, [the debtor] 
has not stated a claim under the FDCPA based upon [the 
collector’s] letter . . . .201 
In the Third Circuit’s view, a straightforward attempt to 
collect a time-barred debt that invites the debtor to “resolve” the 
debt but is silent as to litigation and merely states that the debt 
will be assumed valid if not disputed, which the FDCPA mandates, 
does not violate the FDCPA’s prohibition against threatening to 
take action that cannot be legally taken.202 Although other courts 
agree, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
                                                                                                     
 197. See id. (stating that “even the least sophisticated consumer” would not 
interpret the letter to be threatening litigation). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012) (requiring that debt collection letters 
disclose the fact that they are sent in an effort to collect a debt). 
  200. See Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc, 776 F.3d 393, 399–400 (6th Cir. 
2015) (distinguishing Huertas on this basis). 
 201. Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33. 
 202. See id. (stating that collection letters seeking to “resolve” debts, and 
assuming that such debts are valid if not disputed, do not violate the FDCPA). 
488 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (2018) 
Circuit and various district courts,203 once an offer to settle the debt 
is added to the mix, the scales tilt in the debtor’s favor.  
C. Offers to Settle Time-Barred Debts as Violations of the FDCPA 
The cases summarized above—Beattie v. D.M. Collections, 
Inc.,204 Stepney v. Outsourcing Solutions, Inc.,205 Gervais v. Riddle 
& Associates, P.C.,206 and Huertas—are based on the FDCPA’s 
prohibition against “threat[ening] to take any action that cannot 
legally be taken.”207 An issue those courts did not address is 
whether an offer to settle a time-barred debt may violate the 
FDCPA by falsely representing “the character . . . or legal status of 
any debt.”208  
Effectively extending the FDCPA’s protection—and possibly 
creating a circuit split on the issue—the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have ruled that the FDCPA can be 
violated by a collection letter that is silent as to a possible lawsuit, 
but which offers to settle a time-barred debt without notifying the 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 
2001) (“[I]n the absence of a threat of litigation or actual litigation, no violation of 
the FDCPA has occurred when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially 
time-barred debt that is otherwise valid.”); Shorty v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. 
Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (granting defendant collector’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s FDCPA claim based on defendant’s 
sending plaintiff a notice for a debt which defendant knew was time-barred but 
which did not threaten a lawsuit or further collection action); Johnson v. Capital 
One Bank, No. CIV. A. SA00CA315EP, 2000 WL 1279661, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. May 
19, 2000) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss debtor’s FDCPA claim where 
collection letter sent in regards to debtor’s 20-year old debt did not threaten a 
lawsuit but did threaten future collection action); Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 
168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 527–29 (D. Md. 2001) (finding no FDCPA violation with 
respect to collection letters that failed to notify debtor that debts were time-barred 
but which did not threaten litigation or collection action). 
 204. 754 F. Supp. 383 (D. Del. 1991). 
 205. No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997). 
 206. 479 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).  
 208. Id. § 1692e(2)(a). But see Gervais, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (basing its 
decision on § 1692e(5), and also “find[ing] that because [p]laintiff’s debt was 
time-barred, [d]efendant’s false threat of litigation in violation of § 1692e(5) also 
constitutes a misrepresentation of the legal status of [p]laintiff’s debt under 
§ 1692e(2)(A)”). 
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debtor that the debt is judicially unenforceable and that partial 
payment will revive the statute of limitations as to the entire 
debt.209  
Courts and administrative agencies have given various 
explanations as to why attempts to settle time-barred debts may 
falsely represent the character or legal status of the debt.210 
According to the CFPB, because few consumers know the 
applicable statute of limitations for any particular debt or whether 
the limitations period has run, consumers may interpret an 
attempt to collect a debt as an implied claim that the debt is 
judicially enforceable if they do not pay—a claim that is false for 
time-barred debts.211 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
espoused a similar view.212 
In McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC,213 the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted a similar rationale in a case involving 
two collectors, highlighting each collector’s offer to settle the debt 
combined with the lack of notice that the debt was time-barred.214 
According to the McMahon court, the collection letters at issue 
“misrepresented the legal status of the debts” because “[n]either 
[collector] gave a hint that the debts that they were trying to collect 
were vulnerable to an ironclad limitations defense;” as such, “[a]n 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (examining the circuit split and stating that “a collection letter seeking 
payment on a time-barred debt (without disclosing its unenforceability) but 
offering a ‘settlement’ and inviting partial payment (without disclosing the 
possible pitfalls) could constitute a violation of the FDCPA”); Buchanan v. 
Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397–99 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal of 
FDCPA claim where collection letter contained a settlement offer with respect to 
a time-barred debt and failed to state that statute of limitations had run on the 
debt or that a partial payment would restart the limitations period, even though 
letter did not explicitly threaten litigation); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 
744 F.3d 1010, 1020–22 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding viable FDCPA claims in two cases 
involving collection letters that did not threaten litigation, but that offered to 
settle time-barred debts without notifying the debtor that the statute of 
limitations on the debt had expired or of the effect of a partial payment). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) (2012). 
 211. CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20. 
 212. See FTC Report on Debt Buying Industry, supra note 19, at 47 (arguing 
that consumers may believe time-barred debts are enforceable). 
 213. 744 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014).  
 214. See id. at 1020 (stating that debt collectors must not mislead consumers 
to believe that time-barred debts are enforceable). 
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unsophisticated consumer . . . could have been led to believe that 
her debt was legally enforceable,”215 or that the collector “could 
successfully sue on the debt,”216 even though such a suit, were it to 
be filed, could be easily dismissed.217 The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agrees, declaring that a settlement offer on a time-barred 
debt that makes no mention of its status might be actionably 
“misleading” because such an offer “may falsely imply that 
payment could be compelled through litigation.”218  
In these opinions, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits emphasized 
a second major problem with collection letters that fail to disclose 
the status of a time-barred debt. According to both courts, an 
unsophisticated debtor who receives such a letter might 
reasonably assume that some payment is better than no payment, 
which is untrue due to the partial payment rule.219 On this point, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals court declared: 
Some payment is [in fact] worse than no payment. The general 
rule in Michigan is that partial payment restarts the 
statute-of-limitations clock, giving the creditor a new 
opportunity to sue for the full debt. As a result, paying anything 
less than the settlement offer exposes a debtor to substantial 
new risk. This point is almost assuredly not within the ken of 
most people . . . . It thus is not hard to imagine how attempts to 
collect time-barred debt might mislead consumers trying their 
best to repay. Without disclosure [regarding the partial 
                                                                                                     
 215. Id. at 1021. 
 216. Id. at 1022. 
 217. Id. at 1020. According to the McMahon court, a specific threat of 
litigation, as prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), “is not a necessary element of 
[an FDCPA] claim” because a separate misrepresentation about “[w]hether a debt 
is legally enforceable is a central fact about the character and legal status of that 
debt,” which itself violates the FDCPA. Id.  
 218. See Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(relying on dictionary definitions of the term “settle” to show the “various ways 
an everyman individual might read the terms”).  
 219. See id. at 399 (“[A]n unsophisticated debtor who cannot afford the 
settlement offer might nevertheless assume from the letter that some payment is 
better than no payment.”); see also McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1022 (“[A]n offer of 
settlement makes things worse, not better, since a gullible consumer who made a 
partial payment would inadvertently have reset the limitations period and made 
herself vulnerable to a suit on the full amount.”). 
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payment rule], a well-meaning debtor could inadvertently dig 
herself into an even deeper hole.220 
In another recent opinion on this issue, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals likewise held that “a collection letter seeking payment 
on a time-barred debt (without disclosing its unenforceability) but 
offering a ‘settlement’ and inviting partial payment (without 
disclosing the possible pitfalls) could constitute a violation of the 
FDCPA.”221  
To protect consumers, several state and local jurisdictions—
including New Mexico, Massachusetts, and New York City—have 
passed laws requiring collectors to disclose that consumers cannot 
be lawfully sued if they do not pay time-barred debts.222 However, 
not all courts agree that offers to settle time-barred debts violate 
the FDCPA,223 and greater uniformity is needed regarding the 
warnings and disclosures collectors should be required to make.  
VI. Proposals 
Upon examining the current landscape with respect to 
time-barred debts, it becomes clear that greater uniformity of legal 
principles and judicial practices is needed to ensure that like 
debtors are treated alike. Quite simply, because debt collection law 
strives to protect unsophisticated consumers, a given debtor’s 
ultimate financial obligation on a time-barred debt should not turn 
                                                                                                     
 220. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 399. 
 221. See Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 513–14 
(5th Cir. 2016); see also id. at 511 (“[A] collection letter that is [1] silent as to 
litigation, but which [2] offers to ‘settle’ a time-barred debt [3] without 
acknowledging that such debt is judicially unenforceable, can be sufficiently 
deceptive or misleading to violate the FDCPA.”) 
 222. See Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR 
67876 n.246 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) 
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (discussing a 
requirement for collectors to disclose to consumers that the collector cannot sue 
for a time barred debt (citing N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-493.2 (2018))). See generally 
N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12 (2018); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.07(24) (2017). 
 223. See, e.g., Johns v. Northland Grp., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 590, 600 (E.D. Pa. 
2014) (rejecting debtor’s argument that collector’s use of the term “settlement 
offer” misrepresented the legal status of the debt or implied that litigation is 
imminent). 
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on his or her knowledge of the complex laws in this area, nor should 
collectors be permitted to take advantage of the relaxed 
evidentiary standards that result from the failure of most debtors 
to defend collection suits.  
In addition, any set of reforms should accomplish the following 
objectives. First, any legal reform should preserve the established 
rule that it is not inherently unlawful for a debt collector to inform 
a debtor that a debt remains unpaid and provide the debtor an 
opportunity to satisfy the debt at a discount.224 Second, debtors 
must be informed at the initiation of collection efforts that a debt 
is time-barred and that any payment will allow the collector to 
pursue payment on the entire debt under a fresh statute of 
limitations period.225 Third, to foster uniformity and codify the 
general trend among courts,226 suits to collect time-barred debts 
should be made explicitly unlawful (in the FDCPA). Fourth, the 
ability of collectors to obtain default judgments on time-barred 
debts should be curtailed. Finally, all of this should be 
accomplished in a manner requiring minimal judicial involvement. 
In combination, the proposals below achieve these objectives.  
A. Proposed Notices Regarding the Age of the Debt and the Partial 
Payment Rule 
Under the FDCPA, debt collection notices are governed by 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g, which requires debt collectors to notify debtors of 
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor; (3) a 
statement that the debt’s validity will be assumed unless the 
consumer disputes it, or any portion of it, within 30 days of 
receiving the notice; (4) a statement that if the consumer timely 
disputes the debt (or a portion of it), the debt collector will obtain 
and mail verification or a copy of a judgment to the consumer; and 
(5) a statement that the consumer may request and receive the 
name and address of the original creditor, if different from the 
                                                                                                     
 224. Supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.  
 225. Supra notes 209–222 and accompanying text. 
 226. Supra notes 127–141 and accompanying text. 
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current creditor.227 Additional required notices with respect to debt 
status are likely on the horizon.  
In July 2016, the CFPB issued an outline of proposals it is 
considering for future debt collection and debt buying rulemaking, 
which is expected to be finalized in 2019.228 The CFPB Outline 
proposes that additional information be included in validation 
notices to assist consumers in identifying the debt, including, 
among other things, the consumer’s full name and address; the 
creditor’s name at the time of default; the account number with the 
default creditor; the amount owed on the default date; the creditor 
to which the debt is currently owed; and the amount currently 
owed.229 The CFPB further proposes notices be included regarding 
consumer rights, such as information on garnishing income.230 
Finally, the CFPB proposes notices regarding the status of 
time-barred debts and the effect of a partial payment. Such notices 
should be required.  
The partial payment rule is particularly problematic in the 
debt collection context because a collection letter that fails to notify 
a debtor that her debt is time-barred or that a partial payment will 
revive the statute of limitations could easily “trick” the debtor into 
reviving the right to sue on the debt for several years to come.231 
To combat this concern, agencies, scholars, and legislatures have 
proposed or adopted various notices that would inform debtors of 
the true status of the debt and of the effect of a partial payment on 
its collectability. Numerous sample notices exist. For example, as 
a result of a consent decree between the FTC and Asset 
                                                                                                     
 227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012) (listing the five requirements stated 
above); see also Johnson v. Capital One Bank, No. SA00CA315EP, 2000 WL 
1279661, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2000) (discussing the requirements of § 1692g). 
 228. See Rosenkoetter & Wier, supra note 54, at *4 (summarizing the CFPB 
proposals). See generally CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12.  
 229. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 376–77 (proposing similar requirements). See 
generally CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F. 
 230. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F, G. 
 231. See Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528 (D. Md. 2001) 
(discussing this concern, but finding that more than mere silence regarding the 
debt’s status is necessary to constitute actionable deception under the FDCPA; 
rather, the letter must actually do something to affirmatively deceive, trick, or 
induce an unsophisticated debtor into reviving her debt and thus changing her 
legal position). 
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Acceptance, LLC, the company must now disclose to consumers 
whether it knows or believes that a debt was incurred outside the 
limitations period using the following language: “The law limits 
how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, 
we will not sue you for it.”232 
Using similar language, debt collector Northland Group, Inc., 
now utilizes a collection letter that provides the following warning 
regarding the statute of limitations:  
The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of 
the age of your debt, [the creditor/owner of your debt] will not 
sue you for it, and [the creditor/owner of your debt] will not 
report it to any credit reporting agency.233 
Going one step further by mentioning the acknowledgment of 
a debt rule, although only with respect to a written 
acknowledgment rather than a partial payment, the following 
notice is now being used by at least one collector: 
Due to the age of your account [the creditor/owner of your debt] 
is not able to file suit against you but if you take specific action 
such as making a written promise to pay, the time for filing a 
suit will be reset.234 
New Mexico and Massachusetts have enacted perhaps the 
most comprehensive laws to address these concerns.235 The New 
Mexico statute declares that the following disclosure is sufficient: 
This debt may be too old for you to be sued on it in court. If it is 
too old, you can’t be required to pay it through a lawsuit. You 
can renew the debt and start the time for the filing of a lawsuit 
against you to collect the debt if you do any of the following: 
make any payment of the debt; sign a paper in which you admit 
that you owe the debt or in which you make a new promise to 
pay; sign a paper in which you give up (‘waive’) your right to 
                                                                                                     
 232. McMahon v. LVNV Funding LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citing United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–182–T–27EAJ (M.D. 
Fla. 2012)). 
 233. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 234. Langley v. Northstar Location Servs., LLC, No. CV H-16-1351, 2016 WL 
4059355, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2016). 
 235. See generally N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12 (2018); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 
7.07(24) (2017). 
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stop the debt collector from suing you in court to collect the 
debt.236 
My proposal would combine aspects of each of the above 
disclosures. My proposed disclosure, which must occur in the first 
written communication in which the collector requests payment, 
would include a short, plain-language statement informing the 
debtor of the time-barred status of the debt and stating that the 
collector will not sue to recover it.237 It would also require the 
collector to state the effect of a partial payment, and would give 
the debtor the ability to avoid that rule by allowing the debtor to 
specify his or her intent to pay only the offered settlement amount, 
whether in full or in installments. My proposed notice is as follows: 
Statute of Limitations: Through statutes of limitations, the 
law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Your debt is 
currently over __ years old [since the date of charge-off by the 
original creditor]. Because of the age of your debt, [the 
creditor/owner of your debt] will not sue you for it, and [the 
creditor/owner of your debt] will not report it to any credit 
reporting agency. 
Option 1: Paying Full Offered Settlement Amount Today: 
The owner of your debt is offering to settle your debt for [insert 
offer amount], which this letter refers to as the “offer amount.” 
You may deem it in your best interest to pay the entire offer 
amount in one payment. To elect this option, you must check 
the box below and submit your payment of [the offer amount] 
within the next 30 days. Once we receive your payment, your 
account will be satisfied in full, resulting in a zero balance, and 
we will not attempt any further collection efforts on this 
account, either through informal collection efforts or through 
litigation.  
□ By checking this box and paying the entire offer amount 
today, I agree that the balance on my debt should be reduced to 
zero and understand that I will no longer owe any additional 
amount on this debt.  
Option 2: Making a Payment Towards the Offered 
Settlement Amount: If, rather than paying the entire offer 
amount within the next 30 days, you instead elect to pay the 
                                                                                                     
 236. N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12.9.B. 
 237. This aspect of my proposal is similar to a CFPB proposed rule. See CFPB 
OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20–21 (requiring a “brief, 
plain-language statement” informing the consumer that the collector cannot sue). 
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offer amount in a series of smaller payments, we must inform 
you that the law would then allow us to seek payment of 
the entire amount of your debt. In the eyes of the law, a 
partial payment on a debt indicates your willingness to pay the 
entire debt and thus restarts the statute of limitations on 
collections for the entire amount owed. You may elect to avoid 
this result. To do so, however, you must indicate your intent to 
pay only the offer amount, and no more, by checking the box 
below and submitting your first payment [of $100]: 
□ By checking this box and making a partial payment today [of 
$100] on this debt, I elect to pay the offer amount in 
installments and do not acknowledge that I owe any sum 
greater than the offer amount. After making today’s payment, I 
agree that I will receive monthly statements requesting 
installment payments in the amount of [5% of the offer amount] 
until the offer amount has been fully paid. I further agree that 
if I fail to make a required installment payment, my only 
obligation will be to pay the missed installment payment at a 
later date along with a small monetary penalty of [the late 
payment fee specified herein]. 
The first, and most important step, towards treating like 
debtors alike and reducing the number of suits filed on time-barred 
debts is a contractually enforceable promise not to sue the debtor 
on the debt. Accordingly, the proposed notice above includes the 
following language: “Because of the age of your debt, [the 
creditor/owner of your debt] will not sue you for it, and [the 
creditor/owner of your debt] will not report it to any credit 
reporting agency.”  
Although such a promise is arguably sufficient in and of itself 
to prevent a subsequent lawsuit under simple principles of offer 
and acceptance, in the event a debtor makes only a partial 
payment in response to such an offer letter, a debt owner could 
reasonably argue that the partial payment revived the statute of 
limitations on the debt and, consequently, the owner’s right to sue 
for it. Accordingly, the additional layer of protection proposed in 
the final paragraph of the above notice, which shows a clear intent 
on the part of both parties to eliminate the partial payment rule 
from consideration, is needed.  
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B. Providing Option of Avoiding the Partial Payment Rule 
The “Option 2” portion of my proposed notice begins with a 
statement of the law as it currently stands in most jurisdictions with 
respect to a partial payment on a time-barred debt. Because my 
proposals aim to prevent debtors from being duped into reviving the 
statute of limitations as to an entire debt and seek to ensure that like 
debtors are treated alike, the final paragraph of my proposed notice 
allows the debtor to affirmatively indicate his intent to pay only the 
offered settlement amount. When a debtor elects this option, courts 
should find that the partial payment rule, which hinges on the debtor’s 
intent, simply does not apply, thereby preventing the collector from 
invoking the rule in any subsequent suit filed on the debt.238  
As discussed in Part IV, unless a partial payment is made under 
circumstances indicating that the debtor intended to pay the entire 
debt,239 it is improper to treat the partial payment as having that effect. 
However, the partial payment rule is counterintuitive to most debtors, 
and a debtor who makes a payment in response to an offer to settle a 
debt for a fraction of what is owed would almost certainly not intend to 
revive the entire debt. Rather, his intent would be to begin paying only 
the offered settlement amount.240 Thus, my proposal simply brings 
modern collection efforts in line with the likely intent of most debtors.  
                                                                                                     
 238. Supra notes 71–87 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 124 (Mass. 1901) (recognizing that 
“[t]he nature of the [debtor’s payment] is to be determined by the intention of the 
debtor as shown by the act, his words, and the circumstances accompanying and 
explaining it”); id. at 123 (examining English authorities and concluding that “if 
[an alleged] acknowledgment be accompanied by circumstances, or words which 
repel the idea of an intention to pay, no promise can be implied”); id. (noting that 
for a partial payment to serve as an acknowledgment of a debt, “in the mind of 
the party paying, such a payment must be ‘a direct acknowledgment and 
admission of the debt, . . . as if he had written in a letter that he still owed the 
[entire] sum’”). 
 240. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20 (reporting the 
Bureau’s belief that “most consumers are unaware of the potential legal 
consequences of making a payment or acknowledging a debt in writing,” and that 
“many consumers may find it counterintuitive that making a payment . . . may 
actually have negative consequences”); cf. Gillingham, 60 N.E. at 123–24  
[S]uppose a debtor says to his creditor: “I acknowledge the debt to be 
just, that it never has been paid, and that I have no defense except the 
statute of limitations. [I] am willing to pay, and I do hereby pay to you, 
one-half of the debt, but I do not intend to waive the statute as to the 
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In effect, my proposal will ensure that any partial payment by the 
debtor will not result in the collector seeking payment for the entire 
debt. In this respect, my proposal is similar to a CFPB proposed rule 
requiring collectors to waive revival of the statute of limitations with 
respect to time-barred debt.241 My proposal differs, however, by 
requiring collectors to explain the partial payment rule and allowing 
debtors to affirmatively reject it. Although the CFPB’s proposal has 
merit, my proposal goes to the heart of the partial payment rule itself, 
directly negating its effect.242 Unlike the CFPB’s proposal, which 
depends on a collector’s promise, my proposal hinges on the debtor’s 
intent, which the partial payment rule specifically considers. 
Accordingly, when my proposed notice is acted upon by a debtor 
through an affirmative statement agreeing to pay only the offered 
settlement amount, and no more, a court subsequently deciding 
whether to apply the partial payment rule would have no doubt about 
the debtor’s intent, which would remain true whether the debt were 
sold to other creditors or debt buyers, who might themselves not agree 
to the type of waiver proposed by the CFPB. For these reasons, my 
proposal has advantages over the CFPB proposal.  
C. Proposed FDCPA Amendments 
1. FDCPA Amendment Clarifying that Filing Suit to Collect on a 
Time-Barred Debt is Unlawful 
As an additional layer of protection against any suit seeking to 
collect an old debt, this Article proposes an amendment to the FDCPA 
                                                                                                     
rest. On the contrary, I insist on my defense as to that, and I never will 
pay any more.” Can it be said that from such a part payment, 
accompanied by such a distinct affirmation of the debtor’s intention not 
to pay more, but to insist upon his defense under the statute, the law 
would have implied a promise to pay the remaining half? 
 241. See CFPB Outline of Proposals, supra note 12, at 21 (proposing to 
prohibit collectors from collecting time-barred debt that can be revived); see also 
Sobol, supra note 5, at 378–79 (advancing a similar proposal). 
 242. See Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (discussing 
English common law authorities on the acknowledgment rule and noting that “an 
acknowledgment or recognition which expressly negatives the promise to pay has 
no effect,” adding that “[w]hen a promise to pay cannot be plainly drawn from all 
the surrounding circumstances the acknowledgment is ineffective”). 
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plainly stating that filing suit to collect on a time-barred debt violates 
the FDCPA. 
As noted, the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using 
“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt,”243 including 
“threat[ening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or 
that is not intended to be taken.”244 The FDCPA further prohibits 
collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt.”245 Although the FDCPA provides 
guidance as to what constitutes an unlawful collection effort, the 
standards are vague, providing room for collectors to argue—in the 
few collections suits where a debtor actually mounts a defense or 
brings her own FDCPA claim—that collection suits on time-barred 
debts are not unlawful.  
Although most courts have held that a debt collector violates 
the FDCPA by filing suit on a debt that appears to be 
time-barred,246 the FDCPA does not explicitly contain such 
prohibition. Thus, Congress should amend the FDCPA to 
affirmatively make filing suit on a time-barred debt unlawful. My 
proposal would simply add a provision to the FDCPA, using 
language similar to the North Carolina statute discussed above, 
making it unlawful “to file suit or initiate an arbitration 
proceeding against a debtor when the debt collector or plaintiff 
knows, or reasonably should know, that such collection is barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations.”247 Following Kimber, my 
proposed amendment would make filing suit or initiating an 
arbitration proceeding on a time-barred debt an unfair and 
unconscionable means of collecting the debt under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692f.248 Making the point explicit in the FDCPA will eliminate 
                                                                                                     
 243. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
 244. Id. § 1692e(5). 
 245. Id. § 1692f. 
 246. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (stating that courts normally 
interpret the FDCPA in the consumer’s favor).  
 247. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-115(4) (2009) (using language similar 
to the proposed language above). 
 248. Supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text. 
500 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (2018) 
the ability of collectors to argue that the matter is unclear, 
naturally reducing the number of such suits.249  
2. FDCPA Amendment Specifying How to Lawfully Collect a 
Time-Barred Debt 
As discussed in Part II, old debts are still valid debts, and 
courts generally agree that the statute of limitations does not 
prevent a creditor from seeking to collect the full amount of a 
time-barred debt outside of court.250 As the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently explained, there is nothing wrong with informing 
debtors that a time-barred debt remains unpaid or allowing them 
to satisfy the debt at a discount.251 The question is simply how this 
request can be communicated in a fair manner that does not 
mislead or deceive the consumer, a matter the FDCPA should more 
clearly address.252  
Encapsulating the concerns of the federal appeals courts that 
have considered the lawfulness of non-judicial collection efforts on 
time-barred debt, the FDCPA should be amended to plainly state 
that it is not unlawful for a collector to seek repayment on a 
time-barred debt via a collection letter, but only if the types of 
notices and promises proposed in this Article are included in the 
collection letter. 
The FDCPA generally specifies the actions a collector may not 
take, but there is also value in providing clear guidance for the 
honest collector as to what may be done. Although the FDCPA was 
enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, the statute 
                                                                                                     
 249. See Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487–88 (M.D. Ala. 
1987) (addressing argument that filing suit on time-barred debt was lawful). 
 250. Supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 251. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(permitting collectors to inform debtors that their debts are unpaid); see also 
Buchanan 776 F.3d at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting that it would have 
been lawful for the debt collector in the case to send the debtor a letter that simply 
recited the amount of her debt and demanded payment in full).  
 252. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012) (prohibiting a debt collector from using “any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in a debt collection effort); id. 
§ 1692f (prohibiting the “use [of any] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt”). 
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was also designed to ensure that debt collectors who abstain from 
such practices are not competitively disadvantaged.253 From the 
honest collector’s perspective, this proposed amendment will 
clarify exactly how a collector may seek repayment on a 
time-barred debt, providing a safe haven for collectors against 
unwarranted FDCPA suits.  
To complement this proposed provision, I further propose an 
FDCPA amendment expressly prohibiting debtors from suing 
collectors who attempt to collect time-barred debts in the 
authorized manner. Given this Article’s objectives to clarify the 
law in this area and reduce the impact of debt collection suits on 
courts, such a provision will go a long way toward preventing suits 
by debtors for collection efforts that most courts agree are lawful. 
D. Stricter Standards for Default Judgments 
As noted, most debtors do not defend debt collection actions, 
leading to default judgments against them, even in cases involving 
time-barred debts.254 Although suing to collect a time-barred debt 
generally violates the FDCPA, such suits still occur and usually 
prevail given that the statute of limitations defense is waived if not 
asserted.255  
Because traditional waiver rules and default judgment 
standards are the true cause of default judgments in such cases, 
amendments to the FDCPA cannot truly fix the problem. 
Moreover, a debtor who fails to defend a collector’s suit on a 
time-barred debt—perhaps due to insufficient financial resources 
or a desire to avoid litigation—is probably just as unlikely to file 
her own suit to challenge the collector’s actions under the FDCPA. 
In addition, although collectors are affirmatively prohibited from 
suing to collect a time-barred debt in some states, this appears to 
be uncommon, and instead courts simply stand ready to dismiss 
                                                                                                     
 253. See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 
948 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that one purpose of the FDCPA was to prevent 
competitive disadvantage for honest collectors). 
 254. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 12 (stating that 
consumers are unlikely to defend themselves against collectors). 
 255. Supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.  
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lawsuits if the debtor defends and asserts the statute of limitations 
defense.256 Accordingly, my earlier proposal of an FDCPA 
amendment making it clearly unlawful to sue on a time-barred 
debt will only partly prevent such suits.  
To fully fix the problem of collector suits on time-barred debts, 
I propose flipping the burden of proof on the statute of limitations 
issue. Quite simply, rather than requiring a debtor to prove a debt 
is time-barred, those who bring such suits should be required to 
prove it is not. To that end, the statute I propose would require the 
plaintiff both to certify in its complaint that the debt is not 
time-barred and to provide evidence to prove the point before a 
judgment, default or otherwise, may be awarded.  
My proposal is best accomplished by state statute. Indeed, 
some jurisdictions have already enacted statutes that contain 
similar requirements. A North Carolina statute, for example, 
provides prerequisites for entering a default or summary judgment 
against a debtor in debt collection suits initiated by debt buyers.257 
The North Carolina statute requires the plaintiff to “file evidence 
with the court to establish the amount and nature of the debt,” 
provides that only properly authenticated business records are 
sufficient evidence, and mandates eight specific items that must 
be included in the business record.258 Minnesota has a similar 
statute.259 The requirements of a sworn statement and supporting 
evidence that a debt is not time-barred would be an easy addition 
to such statutes.  
                                                                                                     
 256. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 19 (stating that 
courts commonly dismiss suits filed to recover expired debts). 
 257. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-155 (2011) (requiring collectors to 
submit evidence establishing the nature and amount of the debt owed by the 
debtor). 
 258.  Id. § 58-70-155(b). The statute requires the following information be 
included in such an authenticated business record: (1) the original account 
number; (2) the original creditor; (3) the amount of the original debt; (4) an 
itemization of charges and fees claimed to be owed; (5)  the original charge-off 
balance, or, if the balance has not been charged off, an explanation of how the 
balance was calculated; (6) an itemization of post charge-off additions, where 
applicable; (7) the date of last payment; and (8) the amount of interest claimed 
and the basis for the interest charged. Id. 
 259. See MINN. STAT. § 548.101 (2013) (requiring debtors to satisfy 
prerequisites before collecting debts). 
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The primary advantage of this proposal is the impact it would 
have on reducing collector suits on time-barred debts. Moreover, 
this reform would require minimal judicial effort because 
collectors, rather than courts, would be required to screen cases in 
advance of filing suit and would be saddled with the obligation of 
securing evidence of timeliness. When done right, this will reduce 
the impact on courts and should not be overly-burdensome for 
collectors, as some are already engaged in the process.260  
As a backstop, courts could develop simple case screening 
systems for complaints on consumer debts to ensure that default 
judgments are not awarded inappropriately. The screening process 
would be primarily performed by non-judicial staff, such as clerk’s 
office personnel, who would be required to ensure that the 
proposed timeliness certification is present. If such certification is 
missing from a complaint, clerk’s office personnel could then notify 
judges and their staff of the deficiency via e-mail (a process that is 
already utilized with many matters in the federal courts), 
prompting chambers to issue form orders requesting such 
information. If the plaintiff is then unable to demonstrate that the 
debt is not time-barred, the case would be dismissed with 
prejudice.261 If, however, the timeliness issue remains unclear, 
evidentiary hearings could be held on the matter, but only as a last 
resort.262  
Although one might argue that this proposal is inconsistent 
with the standards for awarding default judgments, this criticism 
is unfounded. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for 
                                                                                                     
 260. See, e.g., Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLS, No. 07 C 410, 2008 WL 94798, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (describing the detailed practices one law firm used 
to ensure that a suit is not filed on time-barred debt). 
 261. Such a requirement is not unduly burdensome. Cf. Day v. McDonough, 
547 U.S. 198, 206 (2006) (permitting district courts to consider, sua sponte, the 
timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition).  
 262. Courts are already empowered to conduct evidentiary hearings in default 
cases, and they regularly do so when there are questions as to the plaintiff’s proof 
(e.g., in the event damages are uncertain). See, e.g., In re Assigned Consumer Debt 
Default Judgment Applications., Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-
1546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-
2663, 2015 WL 1087512, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2015) (recognizing that when a 
trial court determines not to administratively grant an application for default 
judgment made by a debt buyer, it should order a hearing as a matter of course).  
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example, already enables courts to be more stringent in awarding 
default judgments in debt collection suits.263 Under Rule 55, 
although a defaulting defendant is deemed to have “admit[ted] the 
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact” for purposes of 
determining liability,264 courts recognize that “a default judgment 
cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”265 
Accordingly, even in default scenarios, courts are already in the 
habit of reviewing complaints to determine that the well-pleaded 
factual allegations are sufficient to establish each element of the 
cause of action.266  
In consumer debt cases, courts can be as stringent as they like 
in performing this analysis (particularly under my proposed 
statute requiring admissible evidence to prove the suit is not 
time-barred). A stringent analysis is only fair. By analogy, where 
a plaintiff seeks judgment in a debt collection suit but presents no 
proof that the defendant is in fact the person who incurred the 
debt, the court would be justified in refusing to enter judgment for 
the plaintiff.267 Such rulings reflect the unremarkable premise that 
                                                                                                     
 263. In most states, consumer debt litigation is governed by the same state 
and federal laws and rules of procedure that govern litigation generally. Spector, 
supra note 110, at 261.  
 264. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.  
 265. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1371 n.41 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (“A default judgment is unassailable on the merits but only so far as it 
is supported by well-pleaded allegations, assumed to be true.” (citing Nishimatsu 
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also 
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 
cases recognizing that a defaulting party may, on appeal, contest the legal 
sufficiency of allegations contained in the complaint, thereby requiring appellate 
courts to review the complaint’s allegations). 
 266. See, e.g., Woods v. Sieger, Ross & Aguire, LLC, No. 11 CIV. 5698 JFK, 
2012 WL 1811628, at *3, *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (stating upon default, “the 
Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those 
relating to damages, [drawing] all reasonable inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor,” but 
retains “discretion . . . to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that 
the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action”). On the merits, the court in 
Woods refused to grant plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment on her claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress under an analysis akin to that used 
when evaluating a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. 
 267. See generally Bearden, supra note 103 (arguing that the court is justified 
in failing to enter a judgment where the plaintiff fails to present evidence that 
the defendant is the debtor (citing Royal Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. George, No. ED 
92972, 2010 WL 1223791, at *3–4 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010))); see also In re 
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a judgment should not be awarded where the evidence does not 
support it. Because time-barred debts are by definition no longer 
legally enforceable, the same stringent analysis should apply.  
A recent Minnesota case, which involved twenty-four 
consolidated actions where plaintiffs sought money judgments on 
consumer debts, provides an excellent example of the more 
stringent approach I propose.268 That case, In re Assigned 
Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications269 (Default 
Judgment Applications), involved Minnesota Statute 
Section 548.101, which sets forth procedural and evidentiary 
requirements for a party seeking default judgment in an action on 
a debt where (1) the debt has been assigned; (2) the debt is a 
consumer debt; (3) the debt was incurred primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes; and (4) the debt was already in 
default at the time it was assigned.270  
According to the District Court of Minnesota, Section 548.101 
“was designed to provide protections to Minnesotans sued by 
commercial debt buyers,”271 and “arose from [the Minnesota 
Attorney General’s Office’s] experience with the injustice that may 
result when a debt buyer obtains default judgments based on 
‘incomplete or inaccurate information’” about the debt.272 The 
statute “aims to prevent such situations [where judgments are 
improperly awarded] by establishing a standard array of 
documents that debt buyers must obtain and bring forward, even 
in an application for default judgment—a manner of proceeding 
that does not normally require substantive evidence.”273 As an 
example, the court noted that where a plaintiff seeks to recover 
                                                                                                     
Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications., 2015 WL 1087512, at 
*8–9 (same). 
 268. See In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015 
WL 1087512 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015). 
 269. Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-1546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56-
CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-2663, 2015 WL 1087512, 
at *2 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015). 
 270. MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a) (2013). See generally Assigned Consumer Debt 
Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL 1087512, at *2. 
 271. In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL 
1087512, at *3. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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finance charges accrued after assignment of the debt by the 
original creditor, the plaintiff “must provide evidence of the 
contract terms between the debtor and the original creditor so that 
the trial court may determine whether these charges were 
authorized by the contract.”274 In addition, “if some transaction 
history is necessary to show how the charges were calculated, then 
an affidavit explaining that transaction history must be 
submitted.”275  
Along with the necessary contract terms and transaction 
history, the court also mandated additional evidence, such as 
detailed interest calculations.276 To combat the problem of default 
judgments being awarded against persons mistakenly identified as 
the debtor, the court further required “evidence that it is the 
defendant who owes the debt, rather than someone else,”277 as the 
statute requires.278 Here, the court felt that the debt buyer should 
provide evidence, such as the debtor’s social security number, that 
it has the right person, as opposed to someone with a similar 
name.279 After addressing other evidentiary requirements 
mandated by statute, including the requirement of “admissible 
evidence establishing a valid and complete chain of assignment of 
the debt from the original creditor to the party requesting 
                                                                                                     
 274. Id. at *8. 
 275. Id. 
 276. For instance, the court noted that “if payment was made on the debt after 
it was assigned, a claim for interest should be supported by calculations showing 
the time period that simple interest was accrued on each principal amount,” and 
“any splitting or merging of accounts which affects the calculation of interest 
should be explained and shown.” Id. at *8.  
 277. Id. at *8–9. 
 278.  See MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a)(2) (2013) (requiring proof that the 
defendant is the one who owes the debt).  
 279. See id. (requiring proof of the last four numbers of the debtor’s Social 
Security number, if known); see also In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default 
Judgment Applications, Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-1546, 56-
CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-2663, 
2015 WL 1087512, at *9 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015) (requiring evidence of the 
debtor’s identity).  
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judgment,” such as a bill of sale,280 the court then conducted a 
case-by-case analysis of the twenty-four cases at issue.281 
As these Minnesota authorities reveal, courts and legislatures 
are beginning to recognize the importance of ensuring a valid claim 
exists before a default judgment is awarded in consumer debt 
cases, and have imposed heightened evidentiary standards to 
ensure that result. The proposed requirements of a sworn 
statement and admissible evidence that a debt is not time-barred 
are consistent with this approach.282 With these changes, the 
number of suits filed and default judgments awarded on 
time-barred debts will be reduced, further ensuring like debtors 
are treated alike. 
E. Rule 11 Sanctions Against Attorneys Who Sue to Collect 
Time-Barred Debts 
If my proposals were adopted, filing suit to collect a 
time-barred debt would be expressly prohibited by the FDCPA. 
Given that the action would be clearly unlawful, rules of civil 
procedure could then be used to sanction attorneys for filing suits 
where an attorney knew or should have known a suit to collect an 
old debt was time-barred.283  
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, 
declares that by filing a complaint, a litigant “certifies that to the 
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that, among 
other things, “the claims . . . and other legal contentions are 
warranted by existing law,” and that “the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
                                                                                                     
 280. In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL 
1087512, at *9–12 (citing MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a)(5)). 
 281. See id. at *12–22 (conducting a case by case analysis). 
 282. As with the North Carolina and Minnesota statutes, my proposal would 
be limited to debt collection actions, leaving unsettled the general rules regarding 
waiver of the statute of limitations defense.  
 283. Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (M.D. Ala. 1987). 
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discovery.”284 Rule 11 further allows the court to impose “an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that 
violate[s]” these provisions.285 Because my proposal would flip the 
burden of proof on the statute of limitations issue, requiring the 
plaintiff to present a sworn statement and admissible evidence 
that a debt is not time-barred, Rule 11 sanctions would be 
appropriate where an attorney fails to adequately analyze whether 
a debt is time-barred before filing a collections suit.286 In such 
scenarios, the attorney could not properly certify that its claims 
are “warranted by existing law,” or that its factual contentions 
regarding the status of the debt have evidentiary support.287  
Even if my burden-shifting proposal were not adopted, this 
result should not change. Although Rule 11 sanctions would be 
more appropriate under my proposal, the fact that a defense is 
affirmative has not relieved counsel of their Rule 11 
responsibilities in other contexts, such as claims that were clearly 
barred by res judicata,288 or where there was a clear lack of 
personal jurisdiction.289 Also, courts have already imposed Rule 11 
sanctions for filing suit asserting a claim for which a statute of 
limitations has clearly run.290  
                                                                                                     
 284. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 285. Id. 11(c)(1). In addition, the Rule allows the court, on its own initiative, 
to order a litigant or attorney to show cause why its conduct has not violated Rule 
11. Id. 11(c)(3). 
 286. See Columbus v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 707, 711 (S.D. Miss. 
1986) (recognizing that “Rule 11 requires attorneys to make a ‘reasonable inquiry’ 
into both the law and the facts prior to signing any pleading, motion or other 
paper”). 
 287. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 288. See S. Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. Bludworth, 109 F.R.D. 643, 645 (S.D. 
Miss. 1986) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s attorneys where 
reasonable inquiry into the law of res judicata should have indicated to plaintiff’s 
attorneys that all claims were or could have been advanced in a prior action); 
Simpson v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., No. 93-155-CIV-ORL-19, 1993 WL 666603, at 
*3 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 1993) (same); Columbus, 641 F. Supp. at 711 (same). 
 289. See Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (E.D. Mo. 1984) 
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who filed suit where personal 
jurisdiction was lacking). 
 290. See Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1985) (imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions for filing a time-barred claim); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Rd. 
Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for 
filing a time-barred claim); see also Ehsanuddin v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. CIV 
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VII. Conclusion 
Filing suit to collect a time-barred debt is unfair and deceptive, 
particularly when the suit is motivated by the expectation that the 
debtor will not defend and the hope of obtaining a default judgment 
in an action that would otherwise be dismissed. Threatening to file 
suit on a time-barred debt is arguably worse, as such a threat, 
especially one from an attorney, conveys to a debtor that she better 
pay the debt immediately or risk making matters worse when, in 
fact, the opposite is true due to the partial payment rule. The 
simple solution is to require debt collectors to inform debtors who 
owe time-barred debts of their true status, including the effect of a 
partial payment. However, even greater protections are needed. 
The protections proposed in this Article—notices regarding the 
enforceability of a time-barred debt, an opportunity for debtors to 
avoid the partial payment rule by electing to pay only the offered 
settlement amount, FDCPA amendments that plainly delineate 
lawful and unlawful collection methods for time-barred debts, 
flipping the burden of proof on the statute of limitations, stricter 
scrutiny by courts in default cases involving consumer debts, and 
Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who file suits on time-barred 
debts—would result in more consistent financial outcomes on 
time-barred debts and ensure that most collection activity occurs 
outside of court, alleviating courts of this burdensome litigation.  
                                                                                                     
A 06-708, 2007 WL 543052, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (“Because the statute 
of limitations, whether raised or not, constitutes a legal bar to the debtor’s 
obligation to pay, . . . any suit to collect a debt so barred not only flies in the face 
of Rule 11 but the FDCPA as well.”). 
